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Abstract 
The post-independence history of Kenya is characterized by an unusual mix of stability with ever-
lingering fragility. The high level of elite persistence in Kenya could be seen both as a cause and a 
result of this peculiar nature of the political economy of the country. This paper has the objective of 
studying the effects of historical elite competition and consolidation on political-economic stability 
and institutional transition in post-independence Kenya. The logic of the natural state is applied to 
organize the narrative and analyze the key features (North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), Violence and 
Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History: Cambridge 
University Press). Most of the existing institutional structures in Kenya are built on elite 
configurations inherited from the colonial times. The robust growth performance of the first decade 
after independence was generated by smallholder agriculture, while most of the rent was transferred 
to the elite via state patronage. The political instability of the later years had a lot to do with 
dwindling patronage resources and elite fragmentation. For most part of the political economy 
history of the country, patron-client networks and tribalism have played key role in regulating intra-
elite bargains. Land has always been the leverage used by the elite to manipulate the aforementioned 
structures. Although the Kenyan elite have maintained keen interest in winning via constitutional 
means, they have kept reverting to extralegal avenues whenever intra-elite negotiations seemed to 
have failed to be enforced.  
JEL codes: P16, D72, O55 
Keywords: elites, dominant coalition, economic growth, institutional change, Kenya   
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“Kenya has become a nation of 10 millionaires and 10 million beggars” 
         - J.M. Kariuki, Member of Parliament, assassinated in 1975 
I. Introduction  
Kenya has long attracted the interest of students of political economy for at least two major reasons. 
First, it is characterized by a very high degree of elite persistence; and secondly, it has spent most of 
its post-independence history in the twilight zone of political-economic maturity haunted by the 
constant threat of fragility. The persistence of political elites in Kenya could be demonstrated 
dramatically by studying the personal and professional background of the holders of the top three 
offices in the current administration. The president of the country, Mwai Kibaki, entered the 
national scene at independence in 1963 as the permanent secretary for Treasury. He then became 
the Minister for Finance in 1969, a post he held until 1984. He was also the vice president of the 
country between 1978 and 1988, before he was moved to the Ministry of Health. He joined the 
opposition camp in 1992 to eventually win the presidency in 2002.  The current prime minister of 
the country, Raila Odinga, is the son of the former vice president (1964-1966) and influential 
opposition leader, Oginga Odinga. Finally, the current deputy prime minister, Uhuru Kenyatta, is the 
son of the first president of the nation, Jomo Kenyatta.  
 
As most of the current African countries emerged out of colonization in the first half of the 1960s, 
the hope for successful nation building and vibrant economic performance was all in the air. There 
was no other country, among Anglophone Africa, where the anticipation was stronger than in Kenya. 
Despite several setbacks and a growing internal tension, Kenya managed to live up to its promise of 
peace and stability until only recently. The democratic power transfer after the 2002 election had led 
to a short-lived hope that the county might have joined the league of a few African countries that 
had managed to escape the trap of autocratic politics. That perception of the country by many 
internal and external observers was dealt a blow and curtailed by a rude awakening as Kenya slid into 
violence following the national elections in 2007.  
 
The post-election violence, which has left more than 1000 people dead, called for the 
reconsideration of the ill-understood link between short-term political dynamics and long term 
institutional transformation in countries such as Kenya. Considering the fact that Kenya’s economy 
had been growing at annual rate of 6 percent immediately before the violence, the puzzle at hand 
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further extends to include the relationship between political dynamics and (short run) economic 
growth. Accordingly, the current paper studies the effects of the competition among elites and the 
consolidation of elite coalitions on political economic stability and institutional transition in post-
independence Kenya. Institutional transition is framed generally as the emergence of rule of law in 
the political and economic spheres. More specifically, I examine the link between political stability 
and long-running socioeconomic fundamentals such as ethnic cleavages and income inequality 
against the background of the history of political institutions in Kenya.  The overarching framework 
of the logic of the natural state social orders will be applied to organize the narrative and analyze the 
implications to the issues under question (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009; NWW hereafter)  
 
As a specific case for such a study, Kenya holds a number of interesting features that may be 
relevant for the political economy of many other African countries in prospect or retrospect. Three 
major aspects are identified to have made Kenya an interesting case to study. Like many Sub-
Saharan Africa countries, Kenya has undergone challenging democratic experiments and 
encountered setbacks; unlike many of them, it maintains a highly competitive and vibrant electoral 
landscape. These contrasting features of the country are very important because they indicate that 
short-term political progress cannot be taken at face value when the coalition structure is essentially 
vulnerable and state-society relationships are troubled.  
 
Like many Sub-Saharan Africa countries, Kenya is highly ethnically fractionalized; unlike many of 
them, it is less polarized on the index of ethnic polarization.1 In other words, no particular two 
ethnic groups have overwhelming weight on the demographic scale. This feature may turn out to be 
an advantage in fostering democracy as it could as well be a disadvantage. What determines the 
actual role of ethnic composition on political stability is the strength of the longue durée institutions. 
Therefore Kenya could be a suitable case to examine that particular relationship especially in light of 
its post-colonial history and recent electoral experience. 
 
Like many Sub-Saharan Africa countries, Kenya has a huge part of its labor force in agriculture; 
unlike many of them, it had a burgeoning middleclass at independence. The growing middleclass 
have apparently failed contribute to structural shift away from agriculture; and the rural-urban 
imbalance has remained highly visible. As of 2007, 75 percent of the country’s labor force was 
employed by the agriculture sector whereas the sector contributed only 21.4 percent of the GDP.  
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The above three features which are presented to justify the selection of Kenya as a case are more 
pertinent to a general understanding of Kenya’s political economy in its long-term shape. However, 
there is also a short-term, practical reason that makes studying the political economic dynamics of 
Kenya indispensable. Although international reconciliation efforts and subsequent negotiated 
coalitions appeared to have resolved the post-election stalemate, Kenyan politics still remains at a 
historical cross-road with a fragile political consensus and an ailing state-society relationship. This 
study will contribute to a better understanding of the current political landscape and inform 
international partners on areas where they might have to engage with local stakeholders.  
 
Kenya, as an interesting case, is one of the few African countries that have been thoroughly 
investigated by political economy researchers. Most of the research on the country’s political 
economy was done in the 1980s, when Kenya was struggling to maintain the strong economic 
performance of the early decades of independence at the same time as it cruised through political 
waters troubled by ethnic storms.2 
 
Among the issues that have attracted the attention of researchers and triggered broader public 
debate, land redistribution has remained in the spotlight for a long period as far back as before 
independence. Corruption joined the ranks of topical issues in the political economy of Kenya since 
the 1980s and gained prominence in the 1990s. Ethnic tensions and partisan politics have always 
been lurking behind every public policy issues in Kenya; but it was not until the vulnerable political 
coalition of the 1980s made ethnicity a linchpin of political allegiance that it became an openly 
discussed aspect of political economy.  
 
The political rollercoaster that the issue of land redistribution was riding throughout the second half 
of the 20th century was narrated in Kanyinga (2009). The narration describes the colonial roots of 
private property rights in land and the hasty attempts to redistribute land to certain group of black 
Kenyans in the last decade of colonization. It also goes though the early attempts by the post-
independence administration to “Re-Africaize the Kenyan highlands” and portrays the subsequent 
stalemate that the unfinished business of land redistribution left in the political economy landscape 
of the country. Closely related to the issue of land distribution, the specter of a highly unequal 
income distribution has haunted the political economy of Kenya for several decades. Githinji (2000) 
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highlighted the importance of income inequality in Kenya in a subtle way that slices through the 
structure and contributions to national inequality of urban and rural income distributions. He 
maintains that the potential solutions to the problem of inequality should go beyond quick measures 
as simple income transfers because the root of the problem is deeply imbedded in the 
socioeconomic foundations of the country.  
 
Motivated by the high incidence of public corruption in Kenya (culminating the “Goldenberg 
scandal”3), Bigsten and Moene (1996) solved a simple model of endogenous growth that tries to 
trace the impact on economic growth of bribes and political favoritism in public sector employment. 
In an analytic-narrative way, they show how the kind of political rent-seeking that has been prevalent 
in Kenya could hamper growth in the present as well as diminish potentials for growth in the future 
through its effect on capital accumulation and misallocation of human capital. The empirical 
evidence on the growth performance of the country confirms that was actually what happened in the 
1990s with rampant corruption accompanied by the collapse of per capita income.4  
 
Most of the above political economic problems that have persisted over many decades have 
contributed to the silent destruction of the state-society relationship in Kenya. The fragility of this 
relationship has been masked by factors such as the relative robustness of the middleclass, the 
vibrancy of the media and active engagement of the civil society (Sundet et al., 2009). In light of the 
post-election violence in 2007, Mueller (2008) provides a detailed and systematic analysis of the 
privatization of violence in Kenya that has come out as the ultimate result of a deliberate weakening 
of other state institutions in the interest of increasing the power of the presidency. As rival elites 
sought the protection of ethnic-based gangs in lieu of centralized state protection, violence was 
effectively privatized. She emphasizes the challenges of applying multi-party electoral procedures 
under a situation where the harmony in state-society relationship has been undermined by several 
historical precedents. Using data on the voting patterns from the constitutional referendum in 2005, 
Kimenyi and Shughart II(2010) illuminate the process of coalition collapse in the run up to the 2007 
election. Not surprisingly, their results confirm the importance of ethnic allegiances in voting for or 
against the proposed constitution. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section two provides a succinct 
introduction to the social order framework of NWW. Section three sheds light on the major events 
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of the political economy history of Kenya spanning the whole period since independence. Section 
four is devoted to describing the growth performance of the country and tracing some of the 
impacts of elite relationships on sectoral contributions. Section five takes on the task of interpreting 
the political economy history of the country using the logic of the natural state social order. In the 
same brush, section six singles out three of the major components of Kenya’s natural state dynamics 
and analyzes their bearing on political stability. Section seven will introduce a small extension to the 
NWW framework that explicitly differentiates between groups of elite interests and analyzes the 
paths of institutional change. In the same section, the specific case of the Kenyatta succession is 
used to provide an empirical foundation for the theoretical extension. Section eight concludes.  
 
II. The Natural State versus Open Access Order framework 
In an approach that defines institutional change as an outcome of the dynamism in the underlying 
relationship among elites, NWW have developed an encompassing theory of social orders and their 
evolution through time. Much of the social order theory in NWW is inspired by the various phases 
of social evolution the developed world has passed through, transitioning from highly personalized 
and fragile natural states in Medieval Europe to impersonalized open access orders characterized by 
Schumpeterian competition in post-19th century West. The anchoring idea in this framework is that 
the so-called natural states (or limited access orders) provide order by using the political system to 
limit economic entry and create rents. Then they use the rents to stabilize the political system and 
contain violence. The theory juxtaposes the natural state social order against the developed open 
access order in which case open access and entry into economic and political organizations sustains 
economic and political competition. Making up to what is lacking in most other theories of 
institutional change, the NWW framework provides a well-grounded analysis of the co-evolution of 
politics and economics in a certain society.  
 
The co-evolution of politics and economics is an essential feature of the NWW framework as much 
as it is the alignment of different political and economic organizations that determines the level of 
openness of a certain society. A dominant coalition of elites reigns over society by maintaining a 
double-balance in the political and economic spheres. The attainment of a double-balance refers to 
the existence of symmetry between distribution of rents and distribution of political power.  
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As it would be superficial to lump all natural states under a single category, the NWW framework 
identifies a reasonable level of diversity across the spectrum of natural states. The most rudimentary 
types of natural states are the fragile natural states which are extremely personalized and have 
virtually failed to build any kind of coalition that is capable of containing violence. The second level 
represents basic natural states which have been common in the world throughout history. These 
types manage to “sustain a durable and stable organizational structure of the state.” However, most 
of the organizations are public in basic natural states as they are not yet developed enough to 
support sophisticated private organizations. Finally, the most stable types of natural states are the 
mature natural states which are “characterized by durable institutional structures for the state and 
the ability to support elite organizations outside the immediate framework of the state.” 
 
The characteristics and basic dynamics of natural states could be summarized in the form of three 
simple propositions. The first proposition directly follows from the inherent tendency of natural 
states to use limiting access as a mechanism of stabilization as described above.  
Proposition 1: Natural states limit access to organizational forms  
The second proposition draws on the first proposition and the logic of the double balance. Limiting 
access to organizational forms should be complemented by controlling trade if the dominant 
coalition has to maintain the double balance.  
Proposition 2: All natural states control trade. 
The limit imposed on access to organization and the rents generated through controlling trade 
bestow the elites with distinctive privileges. In order to enforce those privileges and stave off 
potential conflicts among themselves, the elite formulate a particular legal framework.  
Proposition 3: The origin of legal system lies in the definition of elite privileges 
 
Although it is not inevitable, natural states could eventually develop and evolve into open access 
orders. NWW reviewed a long spell of economic history in the western world and showed that the 
transition to open access was anything but teleological. There is no single path that societies could 
follow to transform themselves through different stages of natural state and then to an open access 
order. However, the framework identifies three doorstep conditions for the transition to open access 
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orders that would boil down to impersonalizing intra-elite relationships and opening access to 
organizations for non-elites at a later stage. Those conditions are; 
1. Rule of law for elites: natural states need to come up with sustainable mechanisms to 
adjudicate potential disputes among elites. The law should be credibly enforced given the 
actual distribution of power within the dominant coalition.  
 
2. Perpetually lived forms of public and private elite organizations, including the state itself; 
organizations should be able to survive beyond the lifespan of their individual members. The 
existence of organizations should not be tied to the will of powerful individuals. Eventually, 
organizations should develop their own legal personality with the concomitant set of rights 
and duties.  
 
3. Consolidated political control of the military: finally, natural states should solve the subtle 
problem of consolidating control of the military supported by credible conventions on how 
force is used against individuals and coalition members.  
 
The above conditions are conceived of in a sequential manner so that the first condition contributes 
to the second one, and these two together contribute to fulfillment of the last one. Therefore, the 
key condition for triggering the transition process to an open access order is the first one, i.e. rule of 
law for elites, which essentially depends on how far the elites could transform their privileges into 
rights in a way that is incentive-compatible for every member of the dominant coalition. 
 
The emphasis on the rule of law for elites implies that there is some level of heterogeneity among 
elites. The fulfillment of that particular condition depends on how different interests play out within 
the elite circle. However, the NWW framework fails to make a clear distinction between different 
types of elites. In order to handle this issue, I will take the original framework one step further and 
distinguish between political and economic elites in section seven of this paper. 
 
III. Brief political economy history of post-independence Kenya  
The political economy of contemporary Kenya draws much of its nature and character from the 
colonial period. This is largely because ensuring the continuity of the de facto systems of political 
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and economic organization was in the interest of the new African elites. The peculiar nature of 
Kenya as a colonial ‘periphery center’5 networked with the outposts of Tanganyika and Uganda 
contributed to the creation of such an elite class. The relatively advanced industrialization and 
extensive commercialization of the economy, especially after the Second World War, was also a 
result of the position Kenya held in the regional colonial production system. The moderate level of 
settlement of Europeans, limited to the so-called ‘White highlands’, was key to the development of 
local elites.6 Unlike in Zimbabwe, which was settled by Europeans that had numbered more than 
60,000 at independence or in Uganda, which didn’t have any noticeable white settlement throughout 
the colonial period, Kenya’s settlers created some room for the growth of an African elite group.  
 
The birth of the independent Kenyan nation was enhanced by the Mau-Mau resistance movement 
which had made it clear to the colonial administration that the complete political subjugation of the 
native population was no longer sustainable. However, in the midst of the counterinsurgency 
campaign against the Mau-Mau, the colonial administration managed to co-opt sufficient number of 
loyalist elites. The elitist nature of political co-option was epitomized by the setting of minimum 
requirements of wealth and education for candidacy in the first election of African representatives to 
the legislative council in 1957/58. Additionally, candidates from the Central province, which was the 
epicenter of the resistance movement, were required to appear in an official list of people who had 
never taken a Mau-Mau oath. 7  By institutionalizing the advancement of the loyalist elite and 
manipulating the early land reform program to the benefit of that particular group, the colonial 
administration intended to intensify the process of class formation and therefore dismantle the 
broader social foundations of the Mau-Mau.8  
 
Keeping the preceding description of the pre-independence transition dynamics as a background, 
the following paragraphs provide a succinct narrative of how the political economy patterns of the 
country evolved through the three presidencies Kenya has seen since independence.  A snapshot 
overview of the political economy history of the country is provided in the timeline in Appendix 1. 
 
The Kenyatta era (1963 – 1978) 
In 1963, at independence, Kenya emerged with a two party system with a bicameral parliament and a 
federal structure of government. But the institutional structure was quickly realigned with the actual 
power balance when the regional setup was abandoned in favor of the more cosmopolitan central 
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province tribes (namely, Kikuyu, Embu and Meru). Regionalism had been advocated by the smaller 
and less developed tribes with implicit support from the colonial administration who had considered 
it a viable strategy to preempt the potential of unified attacks on settler interests. So, this was the 
first and arguably the most significant move in which the new elites had chosen to deviate from the 
model setup by their colonial mentors, and asserted their own interest. Subsequently, the junior 
partner in the independence government, i.e. Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), which 
consisted of elites from smaller tribes (mostly Kalenjin and Maasai), was dissolved to be merged 
with Kenya African National Union (KANU). That effectively turned Kenya into a de facto one 
party state. There was a brief spell between 1966 and 1969 when a leftist offshoot of KANU formed 
a new party under the name Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) only to be banned by the government. In 
terms of ethnic politics, the KPU saga marked the beginning of the estrangement of the Luo ethnic 
group which had maintained a fragile love-hate relationship with the dominant Kikuyu ever since 
independence.  
 
The most remarkable ideological statement of the independent Kenyan elite came in the form of 
“the Sessional Paper on African Socialism” in 1965 which, unlike what its name might suggest, had 
enshrined the principles of capitalism and the developmental role of the state. This official position 
did not come as a surprise as it was consistent with the interest of the new African elite as well as the 
remaining foreign interests. By the time the Sessional Paper was produced, a substantial number of 
African elites had accumulated so much wealth as to make them harbor vested interest in the 
stability of the capitalist system. But at the same time, the Kenyatta administration engaged in 
extensive efforts to Africanize a sizeable portion of the economy in a manner that had sometimes 
contradicted the very principles promulgated in its official policy framework. 9  Particularly, the 
Africanization drive undermined the private property rights of Asian Kenyans.  
 
Land has always been at the center of the sociopolitical dynamics in Kenya. Accordingly, access to 
land was used as the most common agenda to mobilize popular participation in different 
organizational forms as early as in the 1920s.10 Not surprisingly, land was the rallying ground for the 
bloody resistance mounted by the Mau-Mau. It was also the reward given by the colonial 
administration to loyalists who fought against the Mau-Mau. Therefore, apart from the traditional 
role it plays in the African system of social organization, land was bestowed with a rather emotional 
role in signifying the accrual of the real fruits of independence to individuals and communities. The 
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decade before independence and the first few years into the Kenyatta era have seen large scale 
transfer of land from settlers to African hands. The willing seller-willing buyer scheme was launched 
to facilitate the transfer of large scale farms intact to African elites who were able to mobilize the 
necessary resources. This was later followed by the “Re-africanization of the white highlands” 
program which was marked by individual resettlements and group purchase of former white owned 
lands. However, landlessness was already surfacing as a major problem in areas where population 
pressure was growing. The problem developed an ethnic dimension because the early land 
redistribution schemes took place across geographic boundaries defining different ethnic groups. 
 
The political strategy followed by Kenyatta to maintain a cohesive state featured a mixture of 
appeasement and targeted repression coated in a law of preventive detention. Land was still being 
redistributed and public sector positions which had been vacated by the outgoing foreigners were up 
for grabs. Hence, it was not very difficult for Kenyatta to buy support and appease disgruntled 
elements, particularly in his own Kikuyu community. The Kenyatta era was also characterized by at 
least three high profile assassinations which have still remained mysterious as to who was behind 
them.11 But, in general, Kenyatta benefited from the political capital he had been endowed with by 
virtue of his position as the founding father of the nation. He had also tactfully constructed a screen 
of reverence around himself that had essentially rendered him, in the eyes of the public, to be above 
any political factionalism and petty wrangling.  
 
The Moi era (1978 – 2002) 
With the aging and poor health conditions of Jomo Kenyatta toward the second half of the 1970s, 
the potential succession issue created a silent storm among the political elites of the country. Daniel 
arap Moi, who had been the Vice President of the country and a loyal ally of the first president, 
finally managed to muster sufficient support from the inner circle to weather the storm and succeed 
to the presidency regardless of his less-affluent and marginal Kalenjin ethnic base. Moi was quick to 
proclaim that he would be following in the footsteps of Kenyatta by adopting “Nyayo” (“footsteps” 
in Swahili) as his administration’s official motto. This strategy bought him some time to remain 
under the shadow of the Kenyatta persona and to control the power balance. However, it proved to 
have reinforced the insecurity of the new president when Moi failed to map out an effective strategy 
to eventually break away from the legacy of the late president.  
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The insecurity of Moi reached climax when an abortive coup d’état was orchestrated by air force 
officers in August 1982, which in turn was largely motivated by the amendment of Kenya’s 
constitution to make the country a de jure one party state. Subsequent years marked the phasing out 
of the tenures of several Kikuyu politicians and civil servants as well as the shift of the center of 
power from technocratic provincial administrations to regional KANU branches. Regionalism with 
district focus was brought back to the fore in an attempt to dilute the influence of powerful 
provincial commissioners and the more cosmopolitan Kenyatta elites.12 In congruence with the 
general strategy of building his own loyal coalition, Moi also worked towards changing the ethnic 
mix of the political elite in favor of the smaller Rift Valley tribes, including his own Kalenjin, that 
had constituted the then defunct KADU in the early 1960s.  
 
The change of guard in the 1980s was accompanied by substantial strains on the patronage structure 
that had been buttressed by land giveaways and parastatal resources. That is because the Kenya of 
Moi was never the same as the Kenya of Kenyatta when it came to the availability patronage 
resources. The economy had already been under significant stress after the squandering of the gains 
of the coffee boom in 1977. Global economic activity was sluggish and international terms of trade 
were turning against exporters of primary commodities. More importantly, there was not much land 
available to ‘legitimately’ reward supporters with. Additionally, another area of traditional patronage, 
public sector employment, had already been overstretched. “Unlike Kenyatta, who could give 
without taking away, Moi had to take away before he could give.”13 This reality forced the Moi 
regime to resort to redistributive policy actions as well as large scale political corruption to make up 
for the lack of economic clout of his core collaborators.  
 
The existing land problems that had been inherited from the Kenyatta period were not resolved. On 
the contrary, they were further complicated by the frantic effort to mobilize new resources for 
patronage. Ironically enough, the first ever executive decision Moi had taken after acceding office in 
1978 was suspending the allocation of plots of land.14 However, apart from making a symbolic 
gesture on an issue that always captures the political heartbeat of the nation, Moi could have never 
been serious about substantive land reform since he himself is a large scale land owner. He was 
locked into that position by Kenyatta in the early 1960s in a campaign to buy out the support of the 
Rift Valley elites of whom Moi had been the most prominent one.15 
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Throughout the increasingly repressive rule of the Moi administration, the Kenyatta era elites had 
been bruised, but not completely defeated. Hence, they took advantage of the end of the cold war 
and mounting donor pressures for democratization to force the reinstallation of a multi-party system 
in 1991. However, what followed was a decade long political fragmentation and rising level of 
violence around land issues. The first multiparty elections of 1992 were marred by tribal clashes that 
were instigated by elites threatened by the potential results of popular vote along ethnic lines.16 
Ironically, the violence happened in the elite stronghold of Rift Valley where central province 
communities were settled by the previous government. The violence escalated in the second 
elections in 1997 as the regime’s insecurity grew through time. Obviously, like in all the other 
instances in the history of the nation, land grievances were exploited by the elites to trigger violence 
in the Rift Valley on settlers from central and western provinces.  
 
Finally, a peaceful transition of power based on the results of a democratic election happened in 
2002. Moi was bound by the constitution to two terms in office. But he had to be promised 
immunity and extensive retirement benefits to eventually agree to cede power. Even then, army 
generals were ready to stage a coup when they realized that Moi’s handpicked heir, Uhuru Kenyatta, 
did not win the votes. But they were waved away by Moi himself who calculated that his interests 
would be better protected by letting the inherently fragmented coalition take over.17 
 
The Kibaki era (2003- ) 
Moai Kibaki campaigned on the platform of fighting corruption. He also promised extensive 
reforms in the area of economic governance. Making things easier for him, Moi picked another 
Kikuyu, Uhuru Kenyatta, to represent KANU in the elections. With the tribal element subdued in 
the face of a clash between two politicians from the same ethnic group, the election turned into a 
vote against the past as much as a vote for a better future. Consequently, Kibaki did not need to 
offer a closely scrutinized reform strategy other than appealing to exorcizing the demons of 
corruption to win the final votes. It was all too clear to the outgoing elite that the incoming elites 
were too fragmented and with their own share of skeletons in their closets to make good to their 
promise of rectifying the ills of corruption. Hence, they did not need to put up a fight to hang on to 
office in fear of potential prosecution. The viability of the opposition movement was bolstered by 
the last minute coalition formed by the elites of the two largest ethnic groups: the Kikuyus and the 
Luos.  
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If there was one major lesson that Kenyan politicians had drawn from the tumultuous experience of 
multi-party elections in the 1990s, it was the futility of most of the electoral exercise as long as the 
constitution continued to bestow so much power in the hands of the president. That is why 
opposition politicians and civil society activists shifted the core of their agenda toward the second 
half of 1990s to getting the constitution changed. The winning party, National Rainbow Coalition 
(NARC), had undertaken to table a draft constitution within one hundred days after forming a new 
government and to create a Prime Minister position to share the decision making powers of the 
presidency. The democratically elected government started showing its cracks when it began 
reneging on such promises.  
 
Due to the constitutional reform process the shaky coalition started to unravel. The promises 
offered by the first democratic transition in the history of the nation started to quickly vanish. A 
watered-down version of a new constitution was put up for referendum in 2005. Ethnic allegiances 
dominated over substantive policy differences as the people rallied behind a party of their tribal 
elites and their respective opinions with regard to the new constitution.18 In the referendum, the 
draft constitution was rejected implying ‘no-confidence’ in the government. With the complete 
collapse of the coalition, the Kibaki government intensified its effort to undermine the already 
weakened judicial and political institutions in preparation for the 2007 election showdown.  
 
The 2007 election was too close to call; and it quickly turned violent. The skirmish was more 
extensive than the strategic violence waged around the earlier two elections in the 1990s. Mueller 
(2008) identifies three major factors that have led to the implosion of the political problems of the 
country: diffused violence, deliberately weakened independent institutions, and ethnically driven 
clientalist political parties. The political impunity and the resulting paranoia caused by the 
accumulation of historical problems seemed to have caught up with the country in a way that 
threatened the viability of the nation state itself. The fact that this overwhelming violence happened 
only one term after a peaceful and democratic transfer of power had taken place indicates to the 
inconvenient truth that democratic gains might be reversed quickly in the absence of more durable 
remedies to the problematic components of the overall social contract.  
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Table 1: Summary of political economy development and elite alignment  
Period Identity of dominant 
coalition elites 
Sources of rent and 
patronage  
Major dynamics in 
the political sphere 
Major dynamics in 
the economic 
sphere 
1963 – 
1970 
 
Educated African technocrats 
linked to the colonial system 
Ethnic base: multi-ethnic 
alliance relatively dominated by 
Kikuyu   
Land left by colonial 
settlers, public sector 
jobs left by 
expatriates, foreign 
aid (esp. British) 
Ideological 
competition, political 
consolidation  
Freeing up of 
productive potential, 
beginning of 
indigenous 
accumulation  
1971 – 
1975 
 
Consolidated independence era 
politicians, the nouveau riche 
Ethnic base: increasingly 
Kikuyu dominated 
Allocation of capital 
by state banks, trade 
licenses and 
distribution 
privileges  
Centralized 
presidency, 
institutionalized 
autocracy  
Emergence of strong 
business elites, 
continued 
dependence on state 
patronage  
1976 – 
1981 
 
Allies of former vice president 
Moi, second generation and 
more affluent MPs 
Ethnic base: Kalenjin and 
non-Kiambu Kikuyu alliance*  
Parastatal revenue, 
allocation of public 
and trust land 
(mostly illegal) 
Presidential 
transition, 
continuation of the 
status-quo  
Economic strains, 
end of the era of 
‘soft options’ 
1982 – 
1991 
 
District level KANU officials, 
some Asian Kenyans 
Ethnic base: Kalenjin 
dominated coalition 
Structural 
adjustment loans and 
foreign aid, 
marketing boards 
and parastatals  
Abortive coup, 
autocratic 
consolidation, shift 
to a party sate and 
regionalism 
Realignment of 
business elites with 
Asian Kenyans 
joining the patronage 
network, structural 
adjustment program 
1992 – 
2001 
 
The same elites as in the 
previous decade 
Ethnic base: Increasingly 
Kalenjin dominated as 
remaining Kikuyus and Luos 
join the opposition 
Large scale political 
corruption**, 
redistribution away 
from surplus regions 
Multi-partyism, 
political 
fragmentation, 
elevated ethnic 
tensions  
Economic 
stagnation, large-
scale political 
corruption 
2002 – 
2007 
 
Combination of veteran 
Kenyatta day politicians and 
young opposition members 
Ethnic base: mostly Kikuyu-
Luo alliance  
Foreign aid, large 
scale political 
corruption*** 
Democratic 
transition, coalition 
collapse, 
privatization of 
violence  
The reemergence of 
old economic elites 
*Kimabu is the home district of the first president, Jomo Kenyatta 
** The Goldenberg scandal for instance  
*** Anglo-leasing scandal for instance  
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True to their resilient nature, Kenyans managed to engage in a new constitutional reform process 
after a power sharing arrangement had been brokered by international arbitrators. A new 
constitution has been voted for and adopted in 2010. The new constitution reduces the power of the 
presidency and provides for regional devolution. It also creates room for rectification of historical 
land injustices by sanctifying communal land rights and by recognizing economic and social rights of 
citizens. From the outside, it may look like that the new constitution provides all the answers to 
many of the nation’s historical conundrums. But, Kenya has sufficient lessons from history to watch 
out first for the actual power balance struck among the elites and the de facto implications of any de 
jure changes.  
 
Before concluding this section, it might be useful to summarize the key players in the political 
economy history of the country along with the major threads of political economic development. 
Table 1 presents such summary. As one can see in the table, the composition the elites constituting 
the dominant coalition kept changing with every presidential transition. With power concentrated in 
the hands of the executive, the presidency has always been the linchpin of the dominant coalition. 
Therefore, the tribal mix of the dominant coalition is always aligned with the ethnicity of the 
president. Interestingly, in both major transitions in the history of the country, first in the transition 
to an independent state in 1963 and then in the 2002 democratic power transfer, the alliance 
between the Kikuyu and the Luo has been instrumental. However, in both instances, the coalitions 
fractured eventually. The sources of rent also shifted more and more into distortionary activities as 
the composition of elites changed over time. The summary provided in table 1 will be further 
exploited in section 5 to analyze the political economy of Kenya using the logic of the natural state.  
 
IV. Economic growth performance  
4.1 Trends and sources of growth 
Like most of the newly independent African countries, Kenya was off to a good start economically 
in the 1960s. The uncertainties that had prevailed around independence in 1963 were defused with 
reassurance from capitalistic African elite. In the seven years between independence and the end of 
the decade, real GDP per capita grew by average of 1.88 percent. This real gain was attained 
regardless of 3.3 percent population growth. That was followed by average growth of 1.5 percent in 
the first half of the next decade. This steady average performance in real terms was registered in 
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spite of a global slowdown towards the end of the 1960s and the oil shock of 1973. The encouraging 
performance of the country in the first decade after independence had a lot to owe to the partial 
land reform which had redistributed colonial settler land to more efficient smallholders, and the 
extension of the area cultivated in high value cash crops.19 As table 2 shows, the share of investment 
in GDP also peaked at close to 22 percent in the first half of the 1970s.  
 
Table 2: Basic economic performance indicators 
Period 
Average annual 
growth rate 
Share of government 
consumption of per 
capita GDP 
Share of 
investment of per 
capita GDP 
1963-69 1.88 2.69 11.38 
1970-74 1.51 4.29 21.93 
1975-79 2.72 5.60 17.05 
1980-84 -2.36 5.35 15.56 
1985-89 3.56 4.94 13.60 
1990-94 -2.05 5.49 10.69 
1995-99 0.24 7.34 12.81 
2000-05 0.63 6.59 13.78 
           Source: Heston et al. (2011), Average annual growth rate is calculated using least squares method 
 
The highlight of the second half of the 1970s was the coffee boom that was created due to a massive 
frost in Brazil. On average, real per capita GDP grew by more than 2.7 percent. However, this 
statistical figure, dominated by the effect of the windfall coffee gains, masks so many cracks that 
were becoming visible all across the economy. Inflation was creeping up; the budget deficit was 
growing; and the balance of payment problem that had arisen at the time of the oil crisis was 
intensifying. “The Achilles heel of the economy has been the country’s fiscal policy. Inadequate 
control of expenditures (and inability to target them to achieve policy objectives) has been an 
important part of the budgetary problem in Kenya, for total government spending has risen relative 
to economic activity, with serious budget financing difficulties emerging from the late-1970s.”20 
Between 1975 and 1979, the share of government consumption in GDP grew by about one third 
compared to the previous half-decade (see table 2). Adding to the long-run nature of the problem, 
new land that had fueled the growth of smallholder output was already running out. The potential 
for politically safe redistribution also had been exhausted.  
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The second oil shock of 1979 and the ensuing recession gave Kenya’s economy the last push on its 
downward journey. The economic problems caused by accumulating macroeconomic woes and 
international misfortunes were exacerbated by political instability and extensive drought. As Kenya 
was running out of ‘soft options’, it resorted to IMF’s support which came with a list of 
conditionalities.21 Accordingly, as it solicited to be rescued from recession by the IMF, the country 
was forced to engage in rather contractionary policies by way of paying for its past mistakes. The 
astounding growth performance of the second half of the 1980s was driven by recovery from the 
global recession and another, albeit smaller, coffee boom. Despite the good performance in average 
growth, the share of investment continued to fall throughout the decade.  
 
The recovery was quickly lost and the 1990s saw substantial growth decline and stagnation. Kenya 
subscribed to multi-pronged Structural Adjustment policies. But the share of government 
consumption kept rising throughout the decade as the share of investment hit historic low in the 
first half of the 1990s. This trend of stagnation has not been firmly reversed well into the 2000s. 
Even as many African economies who had not had such strong promise as Kenya in the years after 
independence managed to turn a corner toward the end of the last century, Kenya stayed in the 
category of stagnant economies in the last decade of the 20th century.22 
  
Fig. 1: Growth oscillations in the post-independence era 
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Source: Heston et al. (2011) 
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Kenya’s growth performance has been characterized by enormous degree of volatility. The seesaw 
pattern in growth performance kicked in only a few years after independence when the huge gains 
from the vanishing of colonial in efficiencies are replaced by a downswing caused by global 
recession (see fig. 1). The rapidly alternating peaks and troughs of the growth process indicate that 
Kenya’s economy has been highly susceptible to rainfall and the ‘small open economy effect’ of 
international shocks. A somehow positive assessment of this phenomenon could emphasize the 
resilience of the Kenyan economy to spring back after exogenous shocks especially in the 1960s and 
1970s. Although growth volatility could be argued to be a feature of most developing countries23, 
Kenya’s experience is truly peculiar when compared to the performance of its neighbors. Uganda 
suffered a precipitous economic collapse in the 1970s, from which it has not recovered until the mid 
1990s. Tanzania was caught in a longwinded stagnation until growth picked up towards the end of 
the 1990s. Kenya’s economy has been much more erratic, but characterized by long-run expansion.  
A comparative depiction of the growth trends of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania is provided in 
Appendix 2.24 
 
Table 3: Relative importance of exogenous factors 
Dependent variable: ln of real GDP per worker   
Estimation method: AR (1) 
Spring rainfall (t-1)  .0004*** 
(.0001)  
.0005*** 
(.0001)  
International coffee price 
(coffee arabica)  
 .0023 
(.0100)  
.0029 
(.0092)  
International energy price 
index  
 .0003
(.0004)  
.0003 
(.0003)  
Log likelihood   77.14   76.74   77.18   78.14  
Number of years  39  41 41 39  
 
If exogenous shocks appeared to have such prominent role in swaying Kenya’s economy up and 
down, it is worth looking deeper into the relative importance of those factors in terms of their effect 
on GDP. Table 3 presents the results of a set of time-series regressions trying to explain the natural 
logarithm of real GDP per capita by exogenous factors, proxying weather conditions, export earning 
and import expenditure. In line with the predominantly agricultural nature of the country, rainfall is 
found to be the only significant factor that is strong enough to influence per capita output on 
relatively permanent basis. This means, although the oil crises and the coffee booms accounted for 
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drastic shifts in short term growth performance, the average effects of energy and coffee prices are 
not as strong on real per capita GDP. This result further magnifies the primacy of agriculture in the 
country’s economy.  
 
Fig. 2: Ndulu-O’Connell growth decomposition: the contribution of political instability and unexplained 
shocks 
 
Source: Based on Mwega and Ndung’u (2004) 
 
More nuanced growth decomposition based on a model formulated in Ndulu and O’Connell (2000) 
and applied to Kenya in Mwega and Ndung’u (2004) displays an intriguingly large amount of 
unexplained growth. Apart from the traditional factors labeled as a group of base variables and 
policy variables, political instability is included in the model as measured by incidences of 
revolutions, strikes and assassinations. However, as shown in fig 2, the share of political instability in 
explaining growth is a tiny fraction compared to the share of the unexplained factors. Ironically, the 
pattern of the effect of the unexplained factors matches very well the change in overall political 
atmosphere in the country. For instance, the negative unexplained growth between 1960 and 1964 
could have a lot to do with the uncertainty surrounding independence which is not captured by the 
components used to define ‘political instability’ in the present measure. Similarly, the stability created 
after independence and throughout Kenyatta’s reign matches the positive unexplained growth in the 
1965-74 period, whereas the present political stability measure indicates otherwise. In general, if 
‘political stability’ was broadened to include more subtle components like coalition structure and 
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patronage resources, much of the unexplained growth would be explained in political economy 
terms.  
 
4.2  Sectoral contributions to national output  
The colonial system of production and economic organization had favored large scale farming as the 
backbone of settler livelihood. At the heart of the colonial agricultural policy was the prohibition of 
African smallholders located in the native reserves from engaging in the production of high value 
cash crops. After the end of the Second World War though, the colonial administration promoted 
industrialization and commercialization, sometimes at the expense of Tanganyika and Uganda which 
were integrated into the system as ‘local peripheries’.25 The protection offered to local industrialists 
attracted substantial capital to flow to Kenya in the decade and half before independence. So, it 
might be interesting to see how those elite sectors of the economy fared after independence.  But 
before examining the performance of sectors that have been dominated by elite interest, it is 
important to have an overview of the growth of the traditionally most important sector, agriculture, 
as compared to other sectors. Table 4 shows that agricultural value-added kept growing substantially 
into the 1960s and till the end of 1970s. Although the other sectors expanded at faster rates than 
agriculture, given the prominence of the later as the single most important sector  in the first few 
decades, it is fair to argue that a large chunk of overall expansion of the Kenyan economy was 
attributable to agricultural growth.  
 
       Table 4: Average growth of sectoral value-added and the contribution agriculture to GDP 
Period Average growth 
of agricultural 
value-added 
Average growth 
of manufacturing 
value-added 
Average growth 
of service value-
added 
Share of 
agriculture 
value-added in 
GDP 
1965-69 5.67 7.59 8.31 37.21 
1970-74 3.99 15.41 7.44 32.63 
1975-79 5.14 7.07 6.29 30.74 
1980-84 2.54 3.97 4.42 29.08 
1985-89 4.35 5.58 5.60 27.66 
1990-94 -0.15 2.78 3.32 25.59 
1995-99 4.31 0.61 3.30 25.07 
2000-04 2.21 2.29 2.41 26.56 
      Source: World Development Indicators  
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The share of large scale farms in marketed agricultural produce began its decline immediately after 
independence. This early decline can be attributed to the intensified land redistribution in favor of 
smallholders. The numbers stayed a little below 50 percent for most of the 1970s and the first half 
of the 1980s. There was a sudden hike in the share of large scale farms towards the latter half of the 
1980s following the great drought and the subsequent grain marketing fiasco. The distortions 
created by the politically pampered National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) are blamed for 
much of the marketing and food crisis.26 As fig 3 shows, the following decade was characterized by a 
precipitous fall in the share of large scale farms.  
 
Fig. 3: Share of large scale farms in marketed produce 
 
  Source: Economic Survey, various issues 
 
The manufacturing sector performed well in terms of its contribution of value-added to total GDP 
in the initial decade after independence. The contribution of the sector continued to grow through 
the 1980s and most of the 1990s although the rate was substantially reduced after general economic 
strains took effect towards the mid 1970s. However, an interesting contrast could be drawn with 
respect to the export performance of the manufacturing sector. As seen in fig 4, a remarkable level 
of growth in manufacturing value-added happened in early 1970s whereas the spike in the share of 
manufactured exports did not come until 1975. Even that was most likely due to the decline in the 
share of agricultural exports triggered by an earlier drought and international recession.27  This hints 
an overreliance of the sector on highly protected domestic market during the first decade after 
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independence. With the collapse of the East African Community in 1977, the share of manufactured 
exports hit historic low. The trend was that of general recovery for the subsequent two decades. 
Surprisingly, this happened against the backdrop of overall economic stagnation. Other export 
indicators that largely mirror the trends in manufactured exports are depicted in Appendix 3. In 
terms of ownership, the manufacturing sector remained dominated by foreign capital and state 
owned enterprises. 
 
Fig. 4: Value-added and export contributions of the manufacturing sector 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2009) 
 
Although the new African elites could control manufacturing indirectly thorough parastatals, they 
could not fully embark in this sector for lack of capital and technical capacity.  Therefore sectors like 
wholesale and retail trade and construction emerged as the mainstay of the new elites. Both trade 
and construction displayed the same trend in terms of their contribution of value-added to GDP: a 
sudden jump around the beginning of the 1970s and a quick decline accompanied by longwinded 
stagnation. The early 1970s represented a period when the Africanization drive had been 
reinvigorated to transfer trading interests and real estate property into African hands. No matter 
how much the details remained disputed, the faltering of the Africanization drive toward the second 
half of the 1970s is well documented in the literature.28 The boost in the share of the value-added 
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from trading and construction seemed to have been caused by the efficiency gain out of the early 
efforts to broaden access to those sectors, whereas the subsequent decline was created by the 
overreach of the same effort.  
 
Fig. 5: Value-added contributions of elite-focused sectors 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2009) 
 
The steadiest growth in the share of value-added has originated from the banking sector. Banking 
innovation continued throughout the post-independence era as the financial institutions tried to 
keep up with the changing needs of the capitalist class. Kenya has always been an open country to 
foreign capital in the banking sector. Even in a year like 1981, when the country was struggling with 
an impending stagnation, as many as six foreign banks were starting operations in Kenya.29 It should 
also be recalled that the government have been a majority shareholder in some of the largest banks 
in Kenya.  
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V. Natural state dynamics in post-independence Kenya 
5.1 The birth of a basic natural state 
At independence, it was not very difficult for the new political elite to forge a state that would 
emerge as a strong and viable organization capable of forging a dominant coalition. The colonial 
state had already mastered wielding the tools of economic coercion such as labor repression that it 
applied to facilitate settler accumulation.30 It took the Mau-Mau rebellion for the colonial state to try 
its hands on large scale political and military coercion. The military was composed of the “the King’s 
African Rifles, a small but compact military force nurtured on the British tradition of subordinating 
the military to the government”.31 But the British tradition and the relatively small size of the army 
did not provide sufficient guarantee for the new elite to ensure its subordination. Kenyatta soon 
acted on raising the Kikuyu representation in the army to 23 percent as opposed to earlier near-
exclusivity to Akamaba and Kalenjin tribes.32 He also created the General Service Unit (GSU), a 
paramilitary force, which has become ever since an elite unit loyal to the presidency.  Therefore, the 
post-independent Kenyan government inherited the foundations of a basic natural state from the 
colonial system. Cheeseman (2006) summarizes the pre-independence influence on the construction 
of a limited access order in the following precise terms: 
”In part, the impetus to regulate political space so tightly came from Kenya's white settlers, 
who made the first breakthrough in creating new arenas of political space, and subsequently 
set about defending their right to access these arenas exclusively” (pp. 12) 
 
In the early 1960s, Kenyatta’s way of coalition formation could be described as a tri-pronged strategy 
of cooption, appeasement and continuity. The cooption strategy was applied to make the KADU 
elite cross the isle and join KANU. Kenyatta is normally depicted as a charismatic leader who was 
able to garner reverence from all corners of Kenya’s society. But he himself had realized that he did 
not really live up to that image when he found it difficult to unify his own Kikuyu tribe during his 
chairmanship of the Kenya African Union from 1947 to 1952.33 Therefore, he did not waste time 
before he launched an aggressive strategy of cooption buttressed by promises for cabinet positions 
in his new government. In this process, influential politicians representing smaller tribes that were 
not necessarily benefiting from the cross-regional land redistribution were co-opted.  
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The appeasement strategy was directed towards ex-Mau-Mau rebels who had been excluded from 
the transition process and more specifically from the pre-independence Lancaster House 
negotiations with the British government. When the emergency was lifted and they rejoined the 
society, the rebels also found out that most of their ancestral land in central province had already 
changed hands form white settlers to ‘collaborator’ elites from their own Kikuyu tribe.34 That is why 
it became incumbent upon Kenyatta to appease these disenchanted contingents within his most 
important power base, the Kikuyu tribe. Much of this strategy is executed by resettling the ex-rebels 
in the Rift valley province.  
 
The third strategy of maintaining the status quo is also part of a conscious decision taken by the 
Kenyatta government to stabilize the new coalition. Probably the most powerful symbol of 
continuity is the appointment of Bruce Mackenzie, a settler farmer, to serve as the Minister of 
Agriculture for the first eight years of the independence era.35 The commitment to continuity is also 
demonstrated in the engagement of the British in training and advising the military establishment. 
The last British advisor to the army left only in 1975. 36  At the economic front, the Kenyatta 
government asserted its intention to ensure continuity by ruling out any departures from a capitalist 
mode of economic organization.  
 
Once the dominant coalition was stabilized on a multi-ethnic foundation cemented by relatively 
abundant patronage resources, the government was sufficiently emboldened to begin weeding out 
‘subversive’ elements threatening the stability of the coalition using coercive measures. The first 
most significant act of political coercion was marked by the banning of KPU in 1969 and detention 
of its leadership well ahead of the 1970 election.37 Some of the violent acts of coercion, however, 
were not without consequence to the long-term dynamic stability of the dominant coalition. For 
instance, the assassination of Tom Mboya, who hailed from the Luo tribe and became the second 
most powerful personality in the KANU power structure, revealed the continued fragility of the 
young coalition.38 Those events coincided with the passing of the ‘Local Government Transfer of 
Functions’ Bill which formalized the excessive centralization of power and the virtual beginning of 
the “imperial presidency” embodied in the persona of Jomo Kenyatta. 
 
The economic foundations of the basic natural state of early independent Kenya can be summarized 
in a way that provides empirical support to the three major propositions in the Natural state theory 
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of NWW. The first proposition is: All natural states limit access to organizational forms. Since the most 
important asset in economic life in Kenya is land, some of the most important economic 
organizations were the land buying companies. The companies pooled resources and secured loans 
for the group purchase of land in high density settlement areas. In most of the cases, the land buying 
companies, such as the powerful Ngwataniro Corporation, are headed by ethnic patrons who could 
gain access to land and finances by virtue of their political position within the dominant coalition 
and who could also limit access to clients.39 Ethnic patrons were also influential in limiting access to 
tribe-based investment companies such as the Gikuyu§, Embu, Meru Association (GEMA) and the 
Luo Thrift Union. Capital markets were systematically restricted, first, by the informal networks of 
institutional investors that had emerged from the colonial system, and then by governmental 
institutions such as the Capital Issue Committee.40 
 
The second proposition states that all natural states control trade. The tendency of the post-
independence Kenyan government to control trade is marked by the enactment of the Africanisation 
drive. The drive was embodied in the Trade Licensing Act (1967) and the Import, Export and 
Essential Supplies Act (1967) that promulgated the government’s commitment to reserve certain 
areas of trade for Kenyan citizens. 41  The actual intention of the de facto policy action in the 
Africanisation campaign became apparent as some Asian-Kenyans were forced to quit their 
businesses in contradiction with the de jure provisions that had made the delineation on the basis of 
citizenship, not race.42 Generally, the interventionist nature of the government has been signified by 
the large number of statutory bodies it runs and cooperatives it indirectly controls.  
 
The third proposition of the NWW framework remarks that the origin of legal systems lies in the definition 
of elite privileges. The embodiment of this proposition in the founding structure of independent Kenya 
could not be more visible than in the land law system. As Kenya emerged from the colonial system, 
the elite found themselves possessing more land than the average citizen. Therefore, they instituted a 
legal system protecting private property in land. Doing so, they formally defined their privilege for 
freehold on land that had been governed by customary law in pre-colonial times. However, these 
privileges have not been converted into rights as non-elite freeholders still needed the protection of 
elites to avoid expropriation of their land particularly in tumultuous period of the 1990s.43 
 
                                                            
§ Gikuyu refers to Kikuyu  
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5.2 Coming of age: the evolution of Kenya’s natural state 
By the time Kenya entered the second decade of independence, the era of constitutional politics was 
over, and the ethnic base of the dominant coalition had shifted further to the Kikuyu elite. 
Following suit on colonial tradition, the independence government had structured the day to day 
administration of the country to be carried out by provincial commissioners who reported directly to 
the president. KANU, which had always been a loose collection of regional patrons, was cut out of 
the policy making circuit.44  To make up for the legitimacy that a strong party system based on 
ideological foundations could have provided, the regime devised a system of relatively robust 
internal democracy at parliament level interlinked with a battery of self-help associations, Harambees, 
that serve to link the parliamentarians with the grassroots.45 In the process, Kenyatta achieved the 
status of such an invincible anchor of stability that the extralegal enforcement which is required to 
resolve intra-elite conflict in basic natural states used to come from him.  
 
Fig. 6: The percentage of change in budgetary rent seeking out of total government expenditure  
 
Source: Computed based on data from Economic Survey, various issues 
 
The double balance that should be achieved by limiting entry to both the political and economic 
spaces was effectively maintained for much of Kenyatta’s reign because political power coincided 
with the economic clout of the tribes of the central province. After the economic headstart that was 
given to the political elites through early land allocations, it was possible to shift to more subtle 
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mechanisms of dispensing patronage resources that would effectively limit access via requirements 
of threshold capital. Hence, most of the rent in 1970s was distributed using budgetary means in the 
form of loans to parastatals, subsidies and purchase of equity in private enterprises. Fig. 6 displays 
the substantially high, albeit volatile, ratio of budgetary rent seeking in the 1960s and 1970s. 46 The 
ratio depicted in fig. 6 basically measures the year-to-year change in the allocation of the national 
budget to parstatal loans, subsides and purchase of equity. A sizable portion of this allocation 
accrues to prastatals or private enterprises controlled by the ruling elites. The absolute values of the 
change in budgetary rent seeking declined substantially after fiscal strains showed up after the end of 
the 1977 coffee boom.  
 
However, as economic strains became apparent after the first oil shock and as the social sector 
investments of the independence government in areas such secondary education started churning 
out thousands of ‘prospective elites’, tension started affecting the stability of the dominant 
coalition. 47  The predatory tendencies of the Africanization scheme manifested through the 
replacement of efficient small enterprises owned by Asian Kenyans by less efficient establishments 
owned by African Kenyans also increased after economic strains showed up toward the mid 1970s. 
But these social and economic tensions by their own were nothing compared to the political tension 
they created through persistent rhetoric by populist politicians targeted at attacking the de facto 
restrictions to economic activities. More importantly, the political tension was intensified because it 
originated from within the Kikuyu community, with the potential of rocking the dominant coalition 
at its core. The extralegal procedures for rectifying this particular intra-elite conflict culminated with 
the assassination of J.M. Kariuki, a wealthy and fiery Kikuyu parliamentarian.48 
 
Although he had always made sure that they would not grow into independent centers of power, 
Kenyatta gave the civil service and the judiciary relative autonomy.49 The regime also presided over 
the growth of more other forms of organizations. Some unions such as Kenya Association of 
Manufacturers were bold enough, at times, to openly contradict government policy and lobby for its 
reversal.50 The state allowed the flourishing of ethnic associations with dual interest in social welfare 
and business ventures. One of these associations, GEMA, came close enough to supplanting the 
overly-weakened KANU by mobilizing millions of members and living up to the discipline of 
holding regular internal elections, which were both conspicuously absent in the later.51 GEMA’s 
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leadership consisted of top government officials and some of the wealthiest individuals in Kenya. 
They operated with tacit blessing from Kenyatta. 
 
GEMA’s run as a shadow political party reached a climax when its leaders orchestrated an extensive 
campaign to get the constitution changed in order to bar vice president Moi from succeeding the 
presidency in case the incumbent died in office. The audacity of this attempt, organized by a tribally 
exclusive group which was part of the dominant coalition, might give the impression that the real 
center of power was being fragmented between the state and a splinter group: a quintessential sign 
of a fragile natural state.52 But the key aspect differentiating this trend from typical fragility lies in the 
issue that the elites chose to challenge each other about, namely the constitution. It was also by 
making specific reference to the constitution that the elite group defending the status quo rebuffed 
“the change the constitution” movement. Accordingly, with de jure support acquired through the 
constitution and de facto blessing received from Kenyatta, the intra-elite conflict was resolved and 
Daniel arap Moi succeeded Kenyatta in the eventuality of the latter’s death. Section 7 will specifically 
focus on the dynamics surrounding Kenyatta’s succession.  
 
The first major adjustment that the dominant coalition in Kenya had to go through came in the 
form of Moi’s accession to the presidency. Moi had quickly made an overtly public commitment to 
members of the dominant coalition by declaring ‘Nyayo’ (footsteps) as his central strategy. In the 
absence of a strong and autonomous party, Moi did not have any choice but to reach out for a 
haphazard system of Harambee associations which had essentially represented the economic vetting 
mechanism of a single party electoral system. But he also moved steadfastly on reviving the party as 
the new center of power.  Although he was obviously aware of the confrontation he had faced from 
the Kikuyu elite in the “change the constitution” campaign, he could never afford to exclude the 
Kikuyu at the beginning. That is why he tried “to drive a wedge between Kenyatta’s political 
bailiwick in Kiambu and the other Kikuyu districts”.53  He also took the precautionary measure of 
reshuffling the country’s police force with no fanfare, using the pretext of controlling corruption.54 
 
Moi’s worst enemy, though, did not come from any particular segment of the dominant coalition or 
a non-elite group. The scourge of Moi’s new government was unleashed by the economy. The 
macroeconomic health of the economy had already been disturbed since after the first oil shock. As 
soon as things seemed to get back to normal with gains out of the coffee boom, the windfall was 
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squandered leading to further inflation.55 The economic squeeze could not come at a worse time for 
Moi. As it is, economic contractions always endanger the stability of a natural state coalition. In 
Moi’s case, the contraction happened in his first year in office when he needed to consolidate his 
coalition by integrating his less endowed Rift Valley allies into the patronage system. To make things 
worse, the effects of the economic problems on the general public triggered sporadic protests and 
strike actions.56 
 
When the Moi government rammed the constitutional amendment that turned Kenya into a de jure 
one-party state through parliament, they were trying to preempt the impending collapse of the 
dominant coalition with the risk of the remaining Luo elites breaking away to join a new party that 
would have been formed by Oginga Odinga.57 With the two biggest ethnic groups falling out of the 
dominant coalition, the regime had to quickly adjust the de jure space to its de facto capacity. The 
abortive coup d’état of August 1, 1982 was only a culmination of a long standing fracturing and a 
curtain call of a relatively open basic natural state.  
 
The closing off of access to organizations to the outgoing Kikuyu elites had already started in 
earnest much earlier than the final blockage in the political sphere. GEMA was pressured to wind up 
and its directors were brought to court for failing to file returns in 1980.58  More profoundly, 
targeting the organizational abilities of the professional civil service, Moi ordered the de-registration 
of Kenya’s largest trade union: Union of Kenya Civil Servants.59 This trend continued after the coup 
attempt. Most notably, in 1985, the Kenya Farmers Association was shut down and replaced by the 
Kenya Grain Growers Cooperative Union. This last move was intended to reduce the influence of 
wealthy Kikuyu farmers.60 It also had a second objective of shifting patronage bases in agriculture to 
cereal growers in Moi’s political base in the Rift valley. “(Moi) could only establish a national base 
without disturbing the foundations of landed property itself by using the agricultural bureaucracies 
to promote a fundamental ethno-regional redistribution of resources.”61 
 
As the government tightened its grip on other forms of organization, it obviously maintained the 
tightest of all grips on the state machinery and the judiciary. In a clear departure from the 
professionalism and autonomy that had characterized the civil service in Kenyatta’s times, Moi used 
to rotate senior members of the civil service every two to three years. He also became the chairman 
of both the Public Service and Judicial Service Commissions.62 He set out to ensure the complete 
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subordination of any autonomous enclaves within the state when he “arrogated to himself through 
law the power to dismiss both the Attorney General and the Auditor General at will.”63  The 
government also amended the constitution deleting the provisions for judicial tenure.64  
 
Moi brought the Kenyan nation to the fuzzy area between a basic natural state and a fragile natural 
state when he eliminated the secret ballot system and replaced it with queue voting. This dramatic 
action was coupled with the strict disciplinary measures introduced in KANU’s internal rules to 
destroy any remaining security the elite might have felt inside the dominant coalition and make 
everybody’s fate hang on the goodwill of the president. However, there was about one set of 
independent organizations that the coercive machinery of Moi did not manage to bring into the fold: 
the churches. And that is precisely where the first public protest against the increasingly autocratic 
system originated to later gain traction in the international pressure for democratization at the dawn 
of the 1990s.65   
 
It is no simple coincidence that the spell of economic recovery in the second half of the 1980s 
matched with the revival of multi-party demands. The source of the recovery which is partly 
attributed to the mini-coffee boom in 1986 had brought sufficient windfalls to the coffee growers of 
the central province. Although there were no official avenues left to support electoral candidates of 
their choice, the wealthy farmers could use their money to secretly finance underground 
opposition.66 But the main thrust in support of multi party politics emanated from outside; and it 
came in the form of the suspension of donor funds used to pressurize the cash-strapped Moi 
government. Moi conceded grudgingly to repel section 2A of the constitution that had stipulated a 
single party system and to re-introduce multi party elections. Nevertheless, his narrow coalition, 
apparently, vowed to shift the fight from the high-politics of Nairobi’s elite to the low-politics of the 
rural areas. Outright violence was used to gerrymander and suppress opposition votes in a trademark 
move of a threatened coalition of patrons resorting to attacking the clients of their rival patrons.  
 
Susan Mueller argues that Kenya has carried a legacy of weak institutions, diffused violence and non-
programmatic political parties over into the new century. She also points out that many of those 
aspects are the products of the 1990s.67 Daniel Branch and Nic Cheeseman remarked that Kenya 
was subject to elite fragmentation and state informalization as it was undergoing political 
liberalization.68 Both sets of authors attribute the widespread violence after the 2007 elections to the 
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respective factors mentioned above. But what they failed to do is to put the underlying conditions 
that led to the post-election violence in 2007 in perspective with the corresponding conditions that 
had underlain the peaceful transfer of power only five years earlier in 2002. In other words, why did 
a dominant coalition that had managed to oversee a constructive adjustment only one election-term 
earlier fail miserably to hold itself together in the run up to the next election? 
 
On top of all the above factors that augur fragility, there was, at the same time, a bundle of political 
economic aspects that might have contributed to maturity of the natural state. Although it is 
characterized by high inequality, Kenya has always had a substantial middle class and a growing 
service sector. “Ever since independence, Kenya, unlike most other African countries, has allowed 
strong nongovernmental sector to exist.”69 The residual social capital carried over from the days 
when ethnic welfare associations were popular might have also facilitated mass mobilization. As 
mentioned above, the churches in Kenya are outspoken critics on social and political problems. In a 
stark demonstration of the power of the civil society in the 1990s, a nationwide forum of 
constitutional reform was instituted under the name of Ufungamano to fully detach the review process 
from the influence of the state.70 
  
With the backdrop of a mosaic of the aforementioned factors of fragility and maturity, an elite 
consensus was achieved in 2002 brokered by a supposedly self-enforcing power sharing agreement 
for the new elite and a clean leave exit strategy for the old guard. The major incidents between 2002 
and 2007 between members of the dominant coalition could be summarized as the dishonoring of 
the power sharing agreement and the stalling of the constitutional review process. The occurrence of 
these adverse developments had revealed to the elite that, in the absence of durable institutions, they 
could not rely on the legal enforcement of intra-elite agreements. The collapse of the dominant 
coalition was inevitably followed by violence.  
 
One interpretation of the events of the first decade of the 2000s could be articulated as follows: the 
parameter space for defining the country’s position on the fragile-basic-mature natural state 
spectrum has become narrower. This implies that it is not only a country’s position on the scale of 
natural state development that varies. The configuration of the scale itself could be dynamic 
depending on a host of country and time specific factors. Kenya fulfills many of the preconditions 
that would pave the road to fragility. But it also has a number of active enclaves of maturity as well 
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as a potential for civic engagement that was only deactivated due to the repression in the 1980s. 
Therefore, with the shadows of fragility and maturity lingering in the horizon all at the same time, 
the actual equilibrium is mainly determined by the credibility of the intra-elite enforcement 
mechanisms and the level of centralized control of violence. 
 
VI. Pillars of Kenya’s natural state social order  
6.1 Overlapping political and economic interests 
It has been mentioned recurrently in the proceeding sections that the relative stability of early 
independence Kenya owed much of its source to the fact that the late colonial period African elite 
were drawn from a pool of well educated and wealthier people. What is more interesting in the 
natural state interpretation of the post-independence history of the nation is, however, the manner 
in which this pattern had been perpetuated ever since. Political power has always been a major 
means to accumulate wealth, as much as money has been crucial to attain public office.  
 
The fact that political office leads to material wealth comes down directly from the logic of the 
natural state. Once the elite have acquired political power, it becomes necessary to provide them 
with access to economic rents in order to avert violence. But the other side of the two-way 
relationship, the fact that political power emanates from economic clout, does not necessarily apply 
to every basic natural state. This later part is a peculiar characteristic of states that have drawn their 
social contract based on a substantially inegalitarian initial position, driven by political elites endowed 
with an economic head start. Such states tend to be cohesive as long as they are able to channel part 
of the surplus to non-elites using a patron-client network designed in such a way that keeps the 
clients apart. The next section will deal in detail with how Kenya’s elite manage such a network. 
 
The most glaring example of the institutionalization of ‘money politics’ came right out of KANU’s 
resolution of 1971 which restricted the contest for national-level party seats to members who had 
paid KSh. 1000 in life membership fees.71 The resolution contradicted the official position of the 
government expressed in Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965: “Political rights did not derive from or 
relate to economic wealth or status.”72 However, the stipulations of the resolution were invoked by 
the political elite several times in subsequent years whenever they found it fit to limit access to the 
political  arena. The power of personal wealth in politics increased in later years when the size of the 
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centralized patronage base diminished because of economic stagnation. The number of MPs whose 
main occupation had been business grew dramatically from only 10 percent in 1969 to 27 percent in 
1983.73 
 
Apart from a conscious effort by the elite themselves to share the political space only with the 
affluent, the nature of accumulation in early independent Kenya also contributed to the link between 
money and politics. Initially, land was much of what the new elites got. In order to develop and 
invest on the large farms they took over from the white settlers, they needed to mobilize financial 
capital through loans. On the one hand, wage employment was the only viable collateral and 
indicator of credit worthiness.74 On the other hand, politics was indispensable to secure prestigious 
civil service positions.75 Therefore, the elite would be obliged to enter the bourgeoisie class via the 
bureaucratic corridor. The practice of providing credit based on landownership worsened the 
existing inequality and contributed to the predominance of the same group of elites in the political 
power structure for long time.76 
 
The increasing intervention of the state in the economy in the name of Africanisation was used by 
the dominant coalition to attract more affluent and sufficiently powerful people in need of capital 
and marketing support from statutory bodies. At the same time, it was used to dispense patronage to 
less affluent but politically powerful groups. The net losers out of this process in the 1970s were 
Asian Kenyans who clearly were affluent, but lacked political capital even though some of them took 
part in the struggle for the country’s independence. 77  The state apparatus was further used to 
promote the status of the more affluent members of the coalition to partnerships with foreign 
capital as most of the local service sector is left for their less affluent counterparts.78 A case in point 
is the quasi-legal manner in which the directorship of Lonrho, a giant British owed corporation, 
shifted from Kenyatta’s to Moi’s inner circle as the regime changed in 1978.79 
 
In a single-party state with a highly subdued party and excessively strong presidency, the civil 
servants were the real politicians responsible for policy formulation and national agenda setting.80 
Therefore, the government made sure that the economic interest of this crucial section of the 
dominant coalition had been taken care of by adopting the recommendations of the Ndegwa 
Commission. The report of the commission of inquiry recommended that civil servants be 
permitted to engage in private sector activities subject to certain safeguards.81 However, in the 
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implementation of the recommendations, the ‘safeguard’ portion had been conveniently neglected 
leading to extensive conflicts of interest. Another commission of inquiry, almost 10 years later, 
confirmed the existence of corruption sanctioned by the recommendations of the earlier 
commission.82 Regardless of all the misgivings that had surfaced against the Ndegwa report over the 
years, Moi, as soon as he took over power pledged support to the commission’s recommendations.83 
He did that, apparently, with consideration of the continued use of the policy tool to glue his 
coalition together. 
 
6.2 Entrenched patron-client networks and tribalism  
Throughout its post-independence history, the dominant coalition in Kenya has been organized as a 
massive patron-client network. The installation of self-help organizations (Harambees) as the principal 
units of development and political mobilization had effectively transformed patron-client networks 
into quasi-formal institutions. The effectiveness of the system lies in its role of linking the dominant 
coalition with the grassroots. “To maintain the legitimacy of Kenya’s formal political institutions, 
Kenyatta, and latter Moi, fused them with a system of patron-client relations and Harambee 
cooperative development projects.”84 The role of the organizations in supplementing the taxation 
and redistributive functions of the government was also notable. Unlike regular tax that could 
disappear in the government coffers, the benefits of Harambee contribution could be traced easily 
either in terms of the patronage it has bought or the public good it has financed.85  
 
During Kenyatta’s times, the patron-client mechanism configured around Harambees was used by the 
government to keep the lower level the political arena as competitive as possible. Both wealthy and 
poorer clients will be willing to rally around a patron so much as they are sure that the latter will win 
them access to the national cake and the political inner circle. NWW describe this condition as 
follows:  
Clients have more confidence in patrons if the patrons are embedded in a larger set of social 
arrangements where the patron’s ability to enjoy a stream of rents from his or her clients is 
part of what makes the larger arrangement sustainable. (pp. 38) 
 
Elections were seen as local referenda on the ability of the incumbent to deliver development.86 That 
way, the elites heading a parallel patronage network and the ones in the upper echelons will insulate 
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themselves from the contagion of illegitimacy that could probably creep in if the patron of one 
particular network fails to deliver. Other than that, elections served as a mechanism of redistribution 
of wealth accumulated at the top without resorting to populist policies.87 The important role of 
Harambee projects in the quest for legitimacy is evidenced by quadrupling of reported projects in the 
stormy period of Moi’s rule between 1980 and 1989. During the same period, Moi personally 
contributed Ksh. 130,594,285.88 In a telling declaration of his reliance on patronage networks, Moi 
once spoke to a crowd at a fundraiser: 
“Some of you are wondering where I get so much money to donate. You think Moi has one or 
five friends? I have many friends”89 
 
The upper level of the patron-client network goes straight up to the president.90 According to the 
characterization of the network by Joel Barkan, the president sits as a chief patron on top of a four-
tiered patron-client structure. As depicted in fig. 7, from the president down, the network is fitted 
with clients who themselves are patrons of their respective dyadic network. Cabinet ministers, 
Members of parliament and local elders, who have proven their ability to support their respective 
segment of the dominant coalition populate the lower rungs.  
 
Fig. 7: Patron-client structure during Kenyatta’s reign 
 
                                                          
 
Patron-client networks should be glued by either instrumental or affective ties, or a combination of 
both, that bind the dyadic link between every patron and his respective client.91 In Kenya the 
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instrumental type of ties could be represented by relationships in trade and professional associations 
or civil service networks. But like in many African countries, the most viable and strongest ties are 
the affective ties of tribal identity. The power of tribal identity originates from the very making of 
the Kenyan nation, which was a colonial amalgamation of previously self-contained tribal 
communities. Naturally enough, tribal identity was the only means of mobilizing collective action. 
Accordingly, the first two African organizations formed in 1922 to lobby for native interests were 
ethnic based.92 That particular development set the trajectory for the evolution of socio-political 
organization that has continued well into the 21st century.  
 
The colonial strategy of fragmenting the native reserves along ethnic lines and allocating land 
accordingly gave tribal identity a rather powerful role of delineating viable economic units. This 
trend had obstructed pre-colonial economic interactions between different tribes and put the tribal 
groups on confrontational courses. “‘This conversion of negotiable ethnicity into competitive 
tribalism has been a modern phenomenon,’ writes historian John Lonsdale. ‘Tribe was not so much 
inherited as invented.’”93  But with the intensifying pressure for more rights and the distraction that 
could have created on the colonial administration during the Second World War, all tribal 
associations were banned in 1940 and local mobilization was further reduced to the level of Local 
Native Councils.94 Consequently, Kenya’s polity did not have sufficient experience of trans-ethnic 
political mobilization by the time independence arrived. 
 
The organization of the first national parties, KANU and KADU, as strategic teams of bigger and 
smaller tribes, respectively, is a clear sign of the power of ethnicity in the newly independent country. 
As the most viable basis for mobilizing collective action, the role of ethnicity was not necessarily 
viewed in solely primordial terms. The Weekly Review narrates the assessment of the first major 
ILO study on Kenya on this particular subject: 
“Tribal identity can have many positive aspects. It has been a major element in the harambee 
movement which has contributed so much to Kenya’s development effort…The challenge is 
to develop a policy of integrating Kenya’s ethnic diversity into a differentiated whole, free 
from the debilitating effects of tribal prejudice and discrimination”95 
 
The pitfall identified in the latter part of the preceding excerpt proved difficult to avoid. In a society 
characterized by unbalanced regional development due to settler influence, some groups such as the 
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central province tribes were bound to be more educated and involved in the modern sector. Given 
this fact and the patron-client structure that the dominant coalition is organized around, it follows 
directly from the basic setup that ethnic inequality would be perpetuated with the risk of nurturing 
perceptions of favoritism. One demonstration of the ethnic imbalances in the top echelons of the 
dominant coalition comes with the fact that 30 percent of the cabinet were Kikuyu in 1969, 1974 
and even as lately as 1979 under Moi, whereas the share of the tribe in the total population has never 
been more than 20 percent.96 
 
In such ethnically charged environment, the dominant coalition used ethno-regional networks to 
organize the distribution of rents to non-elites and to contain lower level violence. But in order to 
maintain its own viability, it had to ensure cooperation between different patrons who had the 
potential of wielding violence. Kenyatta, having been comfortable with his position as Baba Taifa, 
Father of the Nation, allowed a certain level of collusion among inter-ethnic patrons. As part of 
their Harambee obligations, local politicians sometimes had to seek sponsorship from politicians from 
other ethnic groups and regions to complement their financial contributions.97 Nevertheless, the elite 
had to be watchful to prevent any significant collusion among the clients that would have threatened 
potential class mobilization.  
 
For most of Kenya’s post-independent history, the elites have succeeded in fragmenting the 
peasantry and urban proletariat using overarching tribal distinctions. Unionized African labor 
struggles for better employment conditions, but when it comes to national politics workers tend to 
vote along ethnic lines.98 The only time ideology had reigned over tribalism in the whole of the 
country’s post-independent history was during the brief period between 1966 and 1969 when KPU 
was established on a left-wing agenda. The party derived most of its support from the petite-
bourgeoisie.99 That development triggered extensive scare on the side of the bourgeoisie; and the 
elites have made sure ever since that ideological differences are downplayed in Kenyan politics. 
Kenya’s elites have learnt their lessons to systematically play the class card when times are good and 
the ethnic card when class relations deteriorate.100 A recent experimental study has also confirmed 
that ethnic affinity trumps liberal attitudes even among girls with prestigious education.101 
 
In spite of the predominance of ethnic politics at a national level, sporadic flurries of intra-ethnic 
tension provided witness to the lingering presence of class consciousness in the highly unequal 
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society. The most prominent case of such tension occurred toward the mid-1970s when class 
struggle within the Kikuyu community, ironically led by a very wealthy MP, ended up claiming the 
life of its leader (i.e. J.M. Kariuki) in a mysterious homicide. Given the strategic position the Kikuyu 
tribe held in the dominant coalition, the tension spilled over easily to the realm of the overall 
coalition, threatening its demise. A lesser known case of intra-tribal class struggle that happened at 
the height of Moi’s kleptocratic rule is the movement of Nandi nationalists, who formed part of 
Moi’s own Kalenjin tribe. In the face of extensive land grabbing by Moi and his allies in their region, 
the Nandi nationalists articulated their land agenda in a class framework rather than on a purely 
patrimonial logic based on ethnicity.102 
 
Daniel arap Moi acceded to the presidency in spite of, rather than because of, such entrenched 
ethnic based patron-client networks. He hailed from an ethnic group that was not as affluent as 
some of the bigger tribes potentially contending for power. Moi started off with appeasing the 
Kikuyu business elite; but he subtly pursued a shift towards redistributive policies from the very 
beginning. However, the calls for a more egalitarian system were focused on reducing disparities 
between Kenya’s principal ethnic groups, glossing over inequalities in the distribution of personal 
income.103 The strategy was essentially geared towards establishing further equality between patrons. 
The regime used the double pronged strategy of extracting surplus from the Kikuyu farmers coupled 
with the political tactic of using elections to weed out the old patrons from the dominant coalition. 
“In 1984, not a single Kikuyu leader from the independence cabinet remained in the Assembly.”104 
On the economic front, Moi turned to seek the alliance of Asian Kenyans when he realized that he 
had failed to co-opt any significant Kikuyu faction. “An uneasy yet mutually accommodating 
relationship between Asian-Kenyan entrepreneurs and African-Kenyans in political power had 
created a highly protected, uncompetitive, and oligopolistic industrial structure.”105 
 
The patron-client analysis by James Scott, based on the historical experience of Southeast Asia, 
predicted that economic growth and increased commercialization would contribute to the 
rearrangement of patron-client networks resulting in the creation of less personalized 
relationships.106 So, why did the robust growth performance and intensified commercialization in the 
1960s and 1970s failed to transform the nature of the patron-client relationships in Kenya? Part of 
the tentative answer to this question could be drawn from the patterns in growth performance 
portrayed in section three. Economic growth in Kenya has been dominated by the performance of 
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the smallholder agricultural sector. Despite its minimal contribution to growth and levels of GDP, 
the modern sector was highly dependent on budgetary patronage from the government (see fig 6).  
 
In case of potential reconfiguration of the patron-client network and subsequent liberalization of 
economic relations, the elite knew that they might not profit from the new system in excess of their 
marginal contribution. Therefore, the elite could not allow the reconfiguration of the very system 
they rely on for legitimacy, rent creation and rent sharing, and risk the eventual collapse of the 
dominant coalition. But at a micro level, where the growth prospect is exogenous to what happens 
to the affective network, economic expansion is shown to have affected the performance of patron-
client networks. Goran Hyden (1988) profiles the fall and rise of the Kibirigwi Farmers Cooperative. 
Because of the mismatch between the affective and organizational boundaries of the cooperative, 
clan rivalries had paralyzed the operation of the cooperative in the 1960s. But when the coffee boom 
happened in 1977, managerial efficiency increased because sufficient scale was created for the 
delegation of operational responsibility to the level of the coffee factory. Hence, this latter 
development “suggests that during the economic boom, the opportunity to reconcile conflicting 
forces within the economy of affection increases, as does the chance of erecting more complex 
institutions.”107 
 
6.3 Land, riches and violence 
As much as land is the centerpiece of the political economy of Kenya, the discussion regarding the 
specific effects of its ownership structure has been interwoven in all of the preceding sections. 
Therefore, the object of this subsection will be reflecting briefly on the interpretation of the overall 
evolution of land institutions in terms of the logic of the natural state.  
 
The settler colony was formed on the basis of land.  The struggle for independence was conceived 
because of grievances on land. Loyalty to the colonial system was rewarded with land. The dominant 
coalition at independence had land at its disposal as the principal carrot and stick. But the elite did 
not want to leave their bet on land open to potential natural state adjustments. Most of the land in 
the central province had already been adjudicated and registered by independence.108 The sanctity of 
private property on land was enshrined in the independence constitution. Fortunately for the elite, 
the property rights creation process did not have to be subjected to the criteria of economic viability 
in terms of financing its own costs. The influx of donor funds attached to the interest of outgoing 
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settlers helped to foot the bill without bothering the dominant coalition to ration privileges based on 
economic criteria. This process was essentially the mother of Kenya’s capitalistic institutional 
framework that was subtly mixed with targeted state intervention.  
 
Another institutional aspect that has been permanently affected by elite calculations around land is 
regionalism. The Kikuyu were allied with the Luo to seek a unitary state because both groups had 
intentions to expand into the Kalenjin territory in Rift Valley. On the other hand, the Kalenjin allied 
with the Luhya to seek a majimbo, federal system, because of fear of encroachment from the first two 
big tribes.109 The issue of regionalism has proved recurring in the political economy platform of the 
country, shaping the debate as lately as in the promulgation of the 2010 constitution.  
 
The creation of freehold titles in the major agricultural regions of the country, and more specifically 
the need for consolidation of plots it entailed, was not received with unanimous euphoria all over 
the country. It was criticized on the ground that it would interfere with the customary way of 
mitigating climatic risk by keeping plots in different agro-ecological zones.110 But the opposition 
from local patrons was persistently quashed by the new national patrons forming the core of the 
dominant coalition as ‘laziness’ and irrational behavior’.111 Apparently, all was not well for the non-
elites. Although the reform was expected to mitigate problems such as land fragmentation, lack of 
collateral for agricultural credit and excessive litigation, “indiscriminate institutionalization of private 
land tenure has actually multiplied them”.112 It also contributed to landlessness and impending tribal 
tension as the availability of disposable titles caused people to quickly sell land to other tribes (e.g. 
Massai to Kikuyu).113 
 
The post-independent law of landownership maintained a mixture of freehold, public land and trust 
land tenures in a way that would stabilize the dominant coalition. Since the core of the coalition was 
assured of the possession of prime land with a freehold title, the patronage needs arising from 
further natural state adjustments have been taken care of by dispensing public land. The commission 
of Inquiry appointed in 2003 to investigate the abuse of public property rights in land throughout 
the post-colonial period came up with the following finding: 
“Public land has been variously allocated for political patronage purposes. Land has been 
given out either as political reward, or in return for political loyalty. In extreme situations, 
public land has been subject to outright plunder through speculation. This latter phenomenon 
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has resulted in the unjust enrichment of a few people at great expense of the general welfare of 
the public.”114 
Actually the enormous wealth the elite have managed to extract out of the land system has always 
been an open secret in Kenya’s public sphere. It was as early as in 1975 that The Times of London 
calculated the landholdings of Jomo Kenyatta and Ngina Kenyatta at over 1 million acres.115 Not 
surprisingly, the introduction of Land Tax had been fiercely resisted regardless of repeated initiatives 
taken by MPs and economic experts to bring the issue to the table. 
 
Landlessness has always been predisposed to be a major threat of stability for any dominant 
coalition in Kenya. Only 8 percent of the country’s land is arable.116 Kenya has had one of the fastest 
population growth rates in the world averaging 3.9 percent in the first two decades after 
independence.117 Planners have warned that Kenya’s economy must grow by at least 15 percent per 
year for the remainder of the century if disaster is to be averted.118 The first phase large-scale 
resettlement scheme did not address the roots of the dynamics of the problem as much as it 
appeased the political base of the then dominant coalition. Rural-urban migration served as an 
exhaust pump to relieve the pressure of landlessness.119 However, with stagnant urban economy, it 
simply shifted the problem to an area where the powerful landed interests would not be bothered.  
 
In the absence of a well developed capital market and prudent financial policy, land is not just a 
productive or patronage instrument, but also a major store of value for Kenya’s elite.120 Therefore, it 
would be fair to expect that the dominant coalition will act to maintain the speculative value of land. 
Policy uncertainty feeds speculative motive. Accordingly, even if there was no risk of losing out of 
reform, the elite would resist land reform to maintain the speculative rent they get out of the policy 
uncertainty.  
 
For most of the three decades after independence, land was used more as a carrot than as a stick. 
Even in the 1980s, when the Moi coalition was beleaguered by economic problems and dwindling 
patronage base, local elites did not try to use land for violence. No matter how strained the 
economic side was, the regime had managed to strike a kleptocratic equilibrium where it combined 
coercion and corruption to limit access to the political space. The reintroduction of multi-partyism 
at the beginning of the 1990s threatened to open the flood-gates of the political space in the face of 
a tight situation where the stagnating economy would have never allowed the existing coalition to 
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balance the economic and political spaces and maintain its members in their privileged place. 
Therefore, historical land grievances were invoked to unleash violence on opposition supporters. 
While smallholder farms in the Rift Valley were desecrated, large-scale farms were not invaded 
because the political elites, who were wealthy farmers themselves, did not want to create 
precedence.121 
 
Apart from exploiting historical land grievances to incite outright violence around election times, the 
Moi elite continued to deliberately weaken the institutions of property rights in land.122 They worked 
to compromise the credibility of the public registers of title, for instance, by issuing double titles for 
a single plot validated by official stamps. This way, they would permanently undermine the public’s 
confidence in the registers. People who received land in the form of patronage would never dare to 
renege on their cliental commitments because there was no guarantee if another title would be 
issued on their plot. By carving an extralegal enforcement mechanism out of the legal system, the 
political elite made sure that economic privileges are not converted into rights. 
 
VII. Elite competition and institutional transition 
7.1 Extended theoretical framework  
The day-to-day reality of dominant coalitions is not as neat and streamlined as the literature might 
suggest. There is constant elbowing and backstabbing that is inherent to the workings of dominant 
coalitions in developing natural states. A brief look at the NWW framework could give one the 
impression of watertight unity between political and economic elites as long as they are part of a 
stable coalition or sub-coalition. Nevertheless, the two groups always rally for their own interests. 
Since the power play-off between these two groups is one of the determinants of the path of 
institutional change, it is treated with some detail in the following paragraphs. 
 
I have devised a two-by-two space of political-economic interaction characterized by different levels 
of influence by the economic and political elites within the dominant coalition. 123  The two 
dimensions represent the influence of the average economic and political elite group as a proportion 
of the overall political-economic capital in the society.  As fig. 8 demonstrates, societies with 
strongly concentrated political elites occupy the upper plane whereas societies with fragmented 
political elites occupy the lower plane of the graph. The same distinction works for the economic 
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elite across the right and left planes. It should be noted that the influence of the groups is scaled in 
relative terms and that is why we find both open access orders and failed states in the same quadrant, 
i.e. quadrant III, due to a reason that will be explained shortly. 
 
 
 
 
The most common cases in contemporary natural states fall in either quadrant IV, where the 
political elites play with a heavy hand or quadrant II, where the economic elites control the state by 
proxy. In the first case, political elites have a unified interest base and sophisticated technology to 
extract rents from fragmented economic elite groups. This results in the predatory behavior of the 
state that we observe in many Sub-Saharan African countries. In the second case, the economic 
elites are organized either in the form of oligarchy or small-but-unified business interests that 
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undermine the capacity of the political elite and demand exorbitant rents created by the state. This is 
manifested in the rampant rent-seeking behavior that usually happens during political transitions and 
in established oligarchies. As much as these scenarios are the most common ones across basic 
natural states, many of those societies do not tend to be static at one point, but rather they switch 
between the two quadrants as the natural state dynamics changes. Fig. 8 depicts the “basic natural 
state highway” along which societies move up and down depending on the power balance within the 
dominant coalition between political and economic factions. The highway maintains the dominant 
coalition in shape by limiting access to the rents in the general pool.  In a more normative sense, the 
highway could be viewed as an equilibrium trap.  
 
Societies could break away from the “basic natural state highway” in two directions. In societies 
where the dominant coalition could not wither the natural state uncertainties, and ensuing 
adjustments, it would eventually fracture and descend to fragility.  This means that after taking the 
left “exit” from the “basic natural state highway”, societies are more likely to eventually end up in 
quadrant III with failed or mafia states. Quadrant III, with a combination of dispersed economic 
and fragmented political elites, uniquely represents the two extremes of all social orders. The key to 
the distinction are institutions, which we have denominated by the third-axis to this particular 
quadrant. The four quadrants of limited access orders - predatory states, mutual hostage, rent 
seeking and failed states - are all two dimensional.  Open access orders represent a shift from 
quadrant I to quadrant III combined with a shift along the institutional axis.  No matter how 
enormous it is in absolute terms, the power of a corporation or a lobbying firm or even a presidency 
in a rich democracy is insignificant compared the overall political-economic capital in the society. 
With a different scale and economic status, that is the same for most failed states. To put it in an 
over-simplistic manner, less the institutions of democracy, property rights, and the rule of law, the 
social order in the United States would be similar to the one in Somalia! 
 
The second way in which societies could diverge from the “basic natural state highway” is by taking 
the right “exit”. That would only materialize if the dominant coalition strengthens itself with self-
sustaining and internally consistent political and economic sub-coalitions. In quadrant I, where both 
the political and economic elites are too strong to override one another, a situation occurs that 
David Kang (2004) calls “Mutual hostage”. This is essentially a prisoners’ dilemma situation as both 
elite groups would be better-off by unilaterally defecting. However, the collective action problem is 
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solved by the dominant coalition and a cooperative solution is very likely once the society moves 
towards the convergence zone (the seesawed region in fig.8). That is where most mature natural 
states would fall in. 
 
The convergence zone is one potential avenue in which mature natural states will move forward 
with solidifying institutions and a declining relative influence of political and economic elite groups. 
This process could eventually carry them across the origin (which could be viewed as the “doorstep” 
in NWW terms) and put them in quadrant III as open access orders. Nevertheless, there is no 
guarantee that every society in the convergence zone would end up being open access order. 
Societies could remain trapped in crony capitalism characterized by an interventionist state and 
strong monopoly interests. 
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Adding more nuance to the transition dynamics, fig.9 shows three of the most likely stable 
equilibrium zones to which many natural states gravitate. In the first case, when the political elites 
get stronger than a certain endogenously determined level while the economic elites are highly 
dispersed, the later will be co-opted by the former.  In the second case, the excessive concentration 
of economic elites coexisting with high level of fragmentation of the political elite will lead to 
privatization of violence within an oligarchic setup. The privatization of violence represents the 
extreme form of a rent-seeking society. In the third case, when both groups are too concentrated, 
cronyism will emerge where political and economic interests will become indistinguishable.  
 
The dynamic aspect of the equilibrium zones is represented by the directions of the arrows in fig.9. 
The portions of the three quadrants where the arrows lie represent unstable equilibrium zones. 
Accordingly, when the current equilibrium of a society is in the polarized zones characterized by the 
extreme dominance of either the political or the economic elites, a unilateral decline in the 
concentration of the strong group without a corresponding increase in the concentration of the 
other side will lead to fragility (i.e. quadrant III). On the contrary, the unilateral strengthening of the 
weak elite group will eventually lead to a mutual hostage situation. Cronyism shifts in favor of one 
group in case the concentration of the other side declines. When the weaker side gains and the 
stronger side loses simultaneously, the ‘cooption’ and ‘privatization’ equilibriums shift into unstable 
zones where the potential path will be determined by further natural state adjustments. Similarly, the 
mutual weakening of the cronyism elites leads to unstable equilibrium. But the later equilibrium is 
qualitatively different from the former two because it involves a potential path to open-access, 
depending on the development of durable institutions.  
 
The preceding analysis implies that societies should probably opt to an even stronger-but-much 
balanced type of elite domination before they move to broad-based political-economic participation 
(for empirical exposition closely mirroring the theoretical analysis here, see Meisel and Aoudia 
(2008)).  Of course this statement comes with unequivocal qualifier that rents should not be 
captured by inefficient groups and the political elite should be reinforced by strong state capacity. 
Given those conditions are in place, we could hypothesize that an inverted U-shape relationship 
emerges between relative elite domination and institutional development (see fig.10). The vertical 
axis in fig.10 represents “balanced elite influence”. This is a concept I come up with to indicate the 
relative level of influence by the average elite group either in the political or economic category.124  
49 
 
   
Intra-elite rule of law can be represented by a vector of institutional characteristics of a subjective 
nature. However, the fundamental emphasis in the NWW framework on the balance between the 
political and economic spheres suggests that there should be at least two major dimensions of rule 
of law. This notion is further reinforced by the importance of the dynamic interaction between 
political and economic elite groups in the lead up to durable institutional change.  At the political 
side of the equation, democracy stands out as a “metainstitution” that is an end in itself as well as 
used as an input for building good economic institutions.125 But it should be recalled that we have 
already fixed our frame of institutional change as one that is characterized by elite domination. 
Accordingly, the concept of democratization that we are implying here is something close to stable 
and coherent “single-party democracy”.  
 
At the economic front, protection of property rights represents the pivotal institutional parameter 
that regulates intra-elite relationships. At the stage we are dealing with, property rights are not 
protected for the whole population. But they are impersonalized for the elites and converted from 
privileges to rights. 
 
7.2 The Kenyatta succession  
Kenya defied the general perception that post-colonial African states are bound to descend into 
political chaos, when its elite honored the provisions in the country’s constitution and let vice 
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president Daniel arap Moi take over the office of the late president, Jomo Kenyatta. This was the 
first major sign of maturity indicating the emergence of durable institutions mediating the 
enforcement of intra-elite bargains. The first question in this context that might be inspired by the 
preceding theoretical framework will concern the extent to which the competition between political 
and economic interests had contributed to the transition. The second question will be why, then, 
was the transition to greater maturity lost after just a couple of years? 
 
The first step in analyzing the empirical dynamics around Kenyatta’s transition using the above 
framework should be understanding the process of consolidation of political and economic elite 
groups in the years before the transition. Section 6.1 has already shed some light on the historical 
overlap between the political and economic interests of Kenya’s elites. Many students of Kenya’s 
history would agree that the first instance of substantive rift between political and economic elites 
happened when Moi acceded to power relying on his less affluent power base. Therefore, the first 
question stated above should be broadened to inquire whether the political transition was a result of 
political-economic elite competition, or the competition was created because of a transition that 
happened due to exogenous forces. 
 
Cognizant of the inherent overlap in the identity of political and economic elites, the following 
analysis focuses on organized interests. This means an individual with a political portfolio and 
business interest could be represented in different organized interest groups that advance collective 
objectives of political or economic nature. Assuming that the political interest groups are mainly 
concerned in rent distribution whereas the economic interest groups are intent on rent preservation, 
a persistent tension between the groups will always exist, the balance of which will determine the 
equilibrium nature of the dominant coalition.  
 
Political interest groups of the 1970s  
With the radicals of KPU already out of the picture, by the dawn of the 1970s, KANU had already 
begun its decent to dormancy. But the ethnic bond, particularly among the Kikuyu, was strong 
enough to maintain a viable political faction. That was about the time when the GEMA entered the 
national scene. Although it was established with a mandate of a social welfare association, most of 
its leadership was composed of political heavyweights including several cabinet ministers. The 
association was able to mobilize the support of wealthy businesspeople and poor farmers alike. Two 
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years after establishment the association decided to pass over the leadership role to business people 
in order to avoid public criticism that it was becoming a political organization. Shortly after, the 
GEMA Holdings Company was incorporated with a share capital of Ksh. 50 million, cementing the 
vested political ambitions of the association with impenetrable economic influence. Most of the elite 
members of the association could hardly be interested in the group for pure profit motives. 
Apparently, many of them had already made a name for themselves in business. According to the 
Weekly Review, GEMA’s membership list “reads like Who’s Who in the world of finance and 
business in Kenya.126 
 
GEMA’s political backside was clearly revealed when the leaders used the association’s platform 
publicly to scramble to save the Kikuyu hegemony that was seriously threatened by the assassination 
of J.M. Kariuki.127 As much as it brought out the association’s political character, the intra-Kikuyu 
tension that followed the assassination severed the core of the association from the non-Kiambu 
Kikuyu elite. At some point, Kenyatta himself did not seem very happy with the aggressive manner 
GEMA played politics. He once asserted at a GEMA rally that he would not hesitate to ban any 
organization whose activities are detrimental to the stability of the country.128 The haste with which 
the political elite tried to revitalize KANU a few months after the Kariuki crisis indicates the 
insecurity they felt with the widening organizational vacuum and the risk of KANU being 
supplanted by GEMA. 
 
The final blow to any surviving and viable Kikuyu faction came with the failed attempt by GEMA’s 
leadership to get the constitution amended to bar the vice president from succeeding the presidency. 
Ironically, the real power implications of the ‘change the constitution’ confrontation had more to do 
with the Kikuyu supporters and challengers of the vice president than the vice president himself.  
The campaign pitted the very powerful Attorney General, Charles Njonjo, who teamed up with 
Finance Minister, Mwai Kibaki, in support of the vice president, against most of the GEMA 
leadership. Most importantly, the support of the patriarch, Jomo Kenyatta, fell on the side of the 
vice president.  
 
After the core of the Kikuyu political hegemony had fallen out, the demonstration effect spilled over 
to other tribal alliances as well.  The silent fragmentation of the political elite continued until the eve 
52 
 
of the 1977 KANU election, which was later cancelled because the president fell ill. Tamarkin (1978) 
describes the general picture of the fragmentation in the following paragraph: 
“The extent of the political fragmentation of the tribes was clearly revealed in the recent intra-
elite struggle between the 'incumbents' and the 'challengers' in the 1977 KANU elections. The 
alliances cut right through most of the tribes. The Kikuyu C. Njonjo and N. Mungai were the 
leading figures in the 'incumbent' and 'challenger' camp respectively. The Kikuyu M. Kibaki 
and J. Gichuru contested the party chairmanship. D. arap Moi, the 'incumbents' candidate for 
vice-president, was to be opposed by T. arap Towett, a fellow Kalenjin.” (pp. 313) 
 
Actually, Kenyatta’s attitude was based on a strategic calculation to divert attention away from his 
Kiambu inner circle in the eventuality of his death.129 In perspective of his old age, by keeping them 
away from the national spotlight, he was trying to help his Kiambu kinsmen to maintain their gains 
after he would be gone.  
 
Economic interest groups of the 1970s 
The fragmentation of economic interest groups in Kenya emanates from the history and structure of 
the economy. As discussed in section 6.2 in greater detail, the organization of the dominant coalition 
on patron-client lines would naturally hinder the businessmen, who are normally clients of political 
patrons, from colluding at an organizational level. The persistent separation between the domains of 
foreign capital and the domestic bourgeoisie created fundamental problems for collective action. 
The parastatal sector, which had grown in importance in the 1970s, adds a third axis to the 
economic space making things rather complicated for organizing elite interest groups.  
 
Manufacturing interest, dominated by foreign capital, was represented by Kenya Association of 
Manufacturers (KAM). Local trading interests were represented by the Kenya National Chamber of 
Commerce (KNCC). As the Africanisation drive intensified toward the mid 1970s, recurrent 
conflicts between the KAM and KNCC began emerging in earnest. 130 The Chamber was behind the 
lobby effort to introduce the Presidential directive of 1974 which ordered all locally manufactured 
goods to be distributed by citizens, effectively cutting out the distributive margins of the 
manufacturers. On the contrary, KAM lobbied for protectionist measures to restrict the inflow of 
imports which are central to the business of many of KNCC’s members.131 
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The balkanization of the economic space was intensified by the limited investment opportunities 
available to the public. The Nairobi Stock Market was accessible only to institutional investors. Even 
that space was further restricted when the government slapped a 35 percent capital gains tax on 
share earnings.132 In the same thrust as the Africanisation drive, the government set out to help the 
public get a foothold in the capital markets. Accordingly, shares were floated by the Industrial and 
Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC). Confirming the pervasive restrictedness of the 
economic space, 90 percent of the shares floated by ICDC in 1970 were bought by the Kikuyu 
middleclass.133  
 
Factors that led to the constitutional power transfer  
Putting together the above pieces of the picture of elite interest consolidation or fragmentation, one 
might realize that the Kenya of the mid-1970s was characterized by political fragmentation and 
polarization of economic interests. Therefore the endogenous part of the transition is predicated on 
Kikuyu political fragmentation that had led to a ripple effect in the form of KANU’s implicit 
division. The fragmentation was not severe enough to threaten the overall stability of the dominant 
coalition because the Kenyatta persona was still there as the ultimate safety valve. Moreover, there 
was no strong, organized economic interest group that would have acted on taking advantage of the 
fragmented political interests to sway the equilibrium into its own rent-seeking state. GEMA was the 
only cohesive economic elite group that had dominated the scene with massive wealth and a 
matching organizational capacity. But, interestingly, GEMA was not per se an economic interest 
group. Particularly after the Karuiki-crisis, its political side overwhelmed the economic one. But that 
could not carry them the day. Their political influence was matched with the impregnable clout of 
Charles Njonjo, not to mention Kenyatta himself.  
 
But the constitutional power transfer could have not been taken for granted based only on the 
endogenous factors described above. There was a critical exogenous factor that had tilted the final 
balance in favor of constitution-based transition in the face of an otherwise indeterminate situation 
produced by the alignment of the endogenous factors. That exogenous factor was the suddenness of 
the death of Kenyatta. After the transition had been over, the Moi government exposed some plans 
that were hatched to militarily prevent Moi from taking over the presidency. 134  Although the 
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endogenous configuration assured the flimsiness of the plot, pure luck was also to take credit to 
some extent.  
 
Reinforcing the effects of the endogenous factors, the occurrence of the coffee boom in the year 
leading up to the transition was another exogenous component. Kenyatta’s later day inclusion of 
new elites into the fold, predicated on a strategy of ensuring eventual stability, was fueled by 
patronage resources earned through the coffee windfall.135 As it turned out, the strategy worked via 
weakening the relative power of individual factions and ensured a peaceful transition.  
 
In terms of the theoretical formulation of the transitional dynamics in fig. 9, the initial equilibrium in 
late 1960s Kenya could be described as ‘cronyism’. That was the time when the political elites had 
rallied around the presidency as the only center of power while the economic elites were composed 
of foreign investors and early African capitalists who were cozy with the former. Towards the mid-
1970s, the decline in the level of concentration of both interest groups shifts the dominant coalition 
to the unstable equilibrium delineated by the inner rectangle in quadrant I.  
 
Why was the transition to an open access order lost?  
It has been noted in the preceding narratives that Moi emerged as a victorious underdog in a 
political environment dominated by affluence and personality cult. Although the constitution had 
been used constructively to bring him to the presidency, he was all too aware of the fact that the 
other institutional prerequisites to sustain his power were not there. For one thing, the quasi-formal 
institutions of patron-client networks were too strong to be supplanted by any form of more 
impersonal institutional set up. Therefore, he had to depend on existing networks and pledge to 
follow in the footsteps of the late president. “The pace at which Moi could restructure the regime 
was necessarily slow as a result of his initial dependence on two senior Kikuyu leaders who had been 
mainstays of the Kenyatta regime, but who had chosen not to support the 'Change the Constitution 
Movement'.”136 
 
But the very fact that he had to rely on the support of a few very powerful individuals with a 
clientalist network that had not necessarily pledged their allegiance to him made Moi inherently 
insecure. He could not expand his tribal coalition and increase the weight of elite concentration on 
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his side fast enough, because the ailing economy had limited his patronage options. Allegations that 
some wealthy individuals were trying to sponsor candidates to parliament also intensified the 
regime’s insecurity. If that threat had materialized, according to the theoretical framework in fig. 9, it 
would have swayed the dominant coalition to a rent-seeking equilibrium in quadrant II.  
 
Moi employed twin strategies to mitigate his insecurity. First, he appealed to populism. He ordered 
employers to take extra 10 percent new employees onto their payroll and he also instructed schools 
to provide free milk to their students.137 It was not too long before the weak economy caught up 
with his populist plans and rendered them far too ambitious. The second strategy was systematically 
reducing the organized influence of the economic elite. In this regard, the government forced 
GEMA to disband and ordered the civil service union, which was the center of professional 
influence, to de-register. At the same time, Moi tried to increase the influence of his winning 
coalition by re-empowering KANU, a process that reached climax when the constitution was 
amended to institute a single-party state.  
 
The transition was lost because Kenya was a maturing state but not yet mature enough to sustain 
fragmented political interests in the face of drying up patronage and unbalanced wealth distribution. 
There was no evidence indicating that the 1982 coup attempt was sponsored by any group with 
organized economic interest. But, if Moi had not preempted the Kikuyu elite by diluting economic 
interest groups, the dominant coalition could have been overwhelmed by the economic elites. After 
the coup attempt, Moi undertook extensive coercive measures to mitigate his insecurity including 
the forced resignation of Charles Njonjo, the Godfather in his ascent to the presidency. Given the 
lack of institutional constraints, the drastic actions taken by Moi in the early 1980s shifted the 
dominant coalition all the way to the extreme corners of a predatory sate, depicted in quadrant IV in 
fig.9.  
 
VIII. Conclusion  
There are a few African countries like Kenya where elites dating back to the independence era have 
stayed in the scene surviving though a tumultuous path of quasi-democratic politics. Kenya has so 
far managed to avoid outright civil war and successful coup d’états.  But it has always flirted with 
lingering fragility bordered by resilient signs of natural state maturity. This paper has set out to 
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explore the economic and institutional factors that have contributed to political stability or the lack 
of it in post-independence Kenya. The NWW framework of natural states has been a useful 
theoretical tool in interpreting the narrative and analyzing the major patterns.  
 
Commitment to the continuity of the institutional structure inherited from the colonial state has 
been the hallmark of Kenya’s political economy. Due to the presence of path-dependence in 
institutional change, the legacy of the colonial institutions persisted for a long time, supported by 
elite interests. The relative stability of the Kenyatta period was replaced by political and economic 
mayhem of the Moi era. But this did not happen because Daniel arap Moi was a person with 
inherent tendencies to dictatorship, at least not any more than Kenyatta was. Moi inherited an 
institutional framework that had organized the dominant coalition based on a structure of 
patronage-intensive patron-client networks. The Kenyatta government had not only left the next 
administration its institutional legacy, but it also bequeathed the Moi government an ailing economy 
exhausted by excessive reliance on state patronage. Moi responded to the natural state adjustments 
with drastic actions that have led to further stagnation and institutional paralysis.  
 
The paradoxical coexistence of natural state fragility and relative maturity in Kenya has been 
demonstrated in no other instance than in the political economy developments in the first decade of 
the 2000s. The country had witnessed the peaceful exit of one dominant coalition in 2002, only to 
suffer under the painful collapse of the new one five years later. Even in the presence of a fertile 
ground for the growth of independent forms of organizations, which normally is a major sign of 
maturity, the persistence of patron-client networks glued by the affective ties of tribal identity have 
undermined the development of other viable basis for collective action. Moreover, some of the 
institutional features, such as regionalism and the land law system, have always been disputed since 
independence. The elite exploited those differences in a manner that has eroded the credibility of the 
whole set of formal institutions which could have been used to enforce intra-elite bargains.  
 
The issue of land has been the linchpin of many of the institutional setups negotiated by the elites. 
Because the elites have already built a dominant coalition driven by the direct control over land or 
indirect control maintained through protection of the privileges of clients, they have the incentives 
to keep land tenure institutions ambiguous. The elite combined the potent forces of patron-client 
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networks and tribalism with historical inequalities to effectively manipulate land both as a carrot and 
as a stick.  
 
Wealth has always taken center stage in determining political influence in Kenya. Being the products 
of a colonial ‘periphery center’, the Kenyan elite were endowed with a conducive environment to 
nurture a capitalist system that also uses the state for targeted protection. The first substantial rift 
between the political and economic elite groups was created after Moi took office. But the 
fragmentation of both the political and economic interest groups had already started before 
Kenyatta died; and it had contributed to peaceful accession of Moi to power. However, the 
transition in the direction of an open access order was lost as Moi failed to transform the unstable 
equilibrium that had emerged after the transition to a more stable less-personalized dominant 
coalition.  
 
Against a background of persistent elitism and high inequality, democracy has had a rough ride in 
Kenya. The historical balkanization of Kenya’s society along ethno-regional lines has made it 
difficult for the elite to strike a workable bargain because they always think they could get a bigger 
slice out of the national cake by reneging on intra-elite agreements and carving a winning coalition 
out of their ethno-regional base. In such a country, where a nation-wide elite consensus on the 
tenets of the social contract has not been reached, it is difficult to expect the conventional tools of 
democratic elections to lead to sustainable political stability. However, the promising feature of the 
political economy dynamics in Kenya, is the fact that the constitution has always been at the center 
of elite competition. Unlike in many natural states, the constitution has not been written off as a 
mere pile of paper. The national shock that was propagated due to the post-election violence of 
2007/08 made Kenyans embrace the constitutional process even more. Hence, as long as the new 
constitution provides a framework for the enforcement of intra-elite agreements, Kenya could 
eventually move to equilibrium where its resilient enclaves of maturity overwhelm the risk of fragility 
emanating from its historical socioeconomic problems.  
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Appendix 2: Historical fluctuations in output in Kenya and neighboring countries 
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Appendix 3: Other export performance indicators  
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2009) 
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